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As wireless communication becomes an ever-more evolving and pervasive part of
the existing world, system capacity and Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning are
becoming more critically evident. In order to improve system capacity and QoS,
it is mandatory that we pay closer attention to operational bandwidth efficiency
issues. We address this issue for two operators’ spectrum sharing in the same
geographical area.
We model and analyze interactions between the competitive operators coexisting
in the same frequency band as a strategic noncooperative game, where the
operators simultaneously share the spectrum dynamically as per their relative
requirement. If resources are allocated in a conventional way (static orthogonal
allocation), spectrum utilization becomes inefficient when there is load asymmetry
between the operators and low inter-operator interference.
Theoretically, operators can share resources in a cooperative manner, but prag-
matically they are reluctant to reveal their network information to competitors.
By using game theory, we design a distributed implementation, in which self-
interested operators play strategies and contend for the spectrum resources in a
noncooperative manner. We have proposed two game theoretic approaches in the
thesis, one using a virtual carrier price; and the other based on a mutual history
of favors. The former approach takes into account a penalty proportional to spec-
trum usage in its utility function, whereas in the latter, operators play strategies
based on their history of interactions, i.e., how well the other behaved in the past.
Finally, based on the simulations, we assess the performance of the proposed game
theoretic approaches in comparison to existing conventional allocations.
Keywords: game theory, inter-operator spectrum sharing, noncooperative game,
cooperative spectrum sharing, carrier price, surplus
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Radio spectrum is defined as part of the electromagnetic spectrum with frequencies
ranging from 3 Hz to 300 GHz. It is used for various wireless communication tasks
- data communications, voice communications, video communications, broadcast
messaging, command and control communications, emergency response communi-
cations, etc. In the past decade, wireless communication services have seen an
unprecedented exponential growth [1] and they are expected to grow tremendously
in the future as well [2]. The studies in [1,3] projected a 1000 times more traffic, and
50 billion connected devices in mobile networks by 2020. According to a study in [4],
the development of 4G systems based on 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
Long Term Evolution (LTE) radio access technology (RAT) is progressing on a large
scale with 55 million users in November 2012 and nearly 1.6 billion users in 2018.
One possible solution to meet the ever-increasing demand is to allocate more spec-
trum for mobile services, e.g., through spectrum farming. In [5], quoted in Fig. 1.1, it
has been shown that by 2014, the mobile traffic per cell site in U.S., will double that
of 2012, causing an estimated spectrum deficit of 275 MHz from the surplus of 87
MHz in 2012. Another study by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
(report ITU-R M.2078 [7]) estimates that total spectrum bandwidth requirements
for International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) services will be up to 1720 MHz
Figure 1.1: U.S. spectrum surplus/deficit situation with growing traffic per cell
site [5]
2by 2020. It will be a challenge to identify such amounts of spectrum and to allocate
it exclusively for mobile services.
Spectrum may be allocated using one of the following authorizations - dedicated,
co-primary and unlicensed. Consider the frequency allocation of main IMT bands
(0.3-30 GHz) by the ITU, shown in Fig. 1.2. It is interesting to observe that in co-
primary authorization usually more than one service share the same spectrum, e.g.,
the frequency band of 3.4-4.2 GHz is allocated for both satellite and fixed services.
In dedicated authorization, spectrum is exclusively allocated for a single service,
e.g., in European region the frequency band of 470-790 MHz is only reserved for
broadcasting at the moment. Finally, in unlicensed authorization, unlicensed multi-
radio coexists in Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz
in which devices like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc. works.
Though the spectrum map in Fig. 1.2 looks crowded, it is important to remark that
it does not indicate the actual spectrum in use. Based on spectrum usage activity,
spectrum utilization in a given geographical area can be regarded as fully utilized,
underutilized (sporadically used) or fully unused. The unused or sporadically used
spectrum in space and/or time could exist due to many reasons, e.g., the system
is idle, or intermittent activity (spectrum holes), or signals are unable to reach the
receiver due to heavy losses. One major cause of this underutilization is the static
(fixed) allocation of spectrum to the various systems. If a system with a static
frequency allocation is not using its assigned spectrum, the resources are wasted.
If other systems could utilize the vacant spectrum, spectrum utilization could be
improved.
Figure 1.2: Summary of frequency allocation from 0.3 GHz to 30 GHz [6]
3Various benchmark studies and measurement campaigns have pointed out that a
large portion of the allocated spectrum is not actively used in space and time. The
FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force in 2002 in their report [8] have reported vast tem-
poral and geographic variations in the allocated spectrum utilization ranging from
15% to 85%. Cˇabric´ et al. in [9] have shown measurements taken in an urban set-
ting revealing a typical utilization of 0.5% in the 3-4 GHz frequency band, further
dropping to 0.3% in the 4-5 GHz frequency band. In survey [10] conducted in 2010
globally, it is found that in densely populated areas, less than 20% of spectrum
bands below 3 GHz are used during a working day and the occupation is even lower
in rural areas.
The incongruence between “spectrum allocation” and “spectrum utilization” sug-
gests that “spectrum allocation” is a more significant problem than an actual physi-
cal scarcity of spectrum. The fixed spectrum allocation generally worked well in the
past because of limited traffic. Nowadays, the pressing demands for more wireless
services and the inefficient spectrum utilization necessitate a new communication
paradigm to use the existing spectrum opportunistically and more efficiently. Op-
portunistic use is not necessarily limited to different services but can also be within
the same service. For example, multiple operators can share the spectrum resources
opportunistically. One promising case could be that operators operating in a shop-
ping mall can use full spectrum resources by localizing themselves to the respective
floors instead of a whole shopping mall area and render mobile services on a co-
primary basis with negligible inter-operator interference.
1.2 Overview of Thesis Problem
Next-generation networks (NGNs) will have higher bandwidth requirements so that
they can meet demands of end user capacities and Quality of Service (QoS). Nowa-
days, operators are largely following fixed spectrum allocation (FSA). Such, static
assignments are disadvantageous because they are time and space invariant, and
prevent devices from efficiently utilizing allocated spectrum, resulting in spectrum
holes (no devices in the area) and poor utilization [11].
Let us consider multiple radio access networks (RANs) owned by different operators
providing wireless services within and around the small area they control, e.g., of-
fices, restaurants, etc. in a marketplace. Within the same geographical area, there
exist different classes of users, as well as different companies/business units, and
may have different peak usage times. With orthogonal assignments, the spectrum
is underutilized when load conditions of neighbouring operators are subjected to
temporal variations. In that scenario, a low load operator could transfer some of
its spectrum resources to a high load operator by using dynamic spectrum alloca-
tion (DSA) and can help it, e.g., in reducing the blocking probability and in avoiding
high latency. DSA can help operators to adapt to varying channel state conditions
and radio frequency environments. If the inter-RAN interference is severe, operators
tend to share the spectrum with a high degree of orthogonality; if the interference
4is negligible, operators tend to have a high degree of overlapped carriers (full spread).
With DSA operators become able to share the spectrum resources as per their
relative needs and exercise better performance in their access area. For this, a
protocol that coordinates the interaction between multiple operators is needed to
achieve improved spectral efficiency by allowing flexible and efficient spectrum use.
This is explored in this thesis.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
In this Thesis, an efficient DSA scheme is proposed to improve the operational band-
width efficiency in a multi-operator scenario. Multiple operators coexist in the same
geographical area causing interference to each other. It is assumed that operators’
RANs have a connection between them. However, the cooperation between oper-
ators is on low level. They are unwilling to share their network and operational
information due to mutual competition. Also they may send false information to
get more advantage from other operators. Operators are thus considered as self-
interested entities and will be contending for spectrum resources noncooperatively.
By noncooperation, we mean that no operational information is shared amongst the
operators. Hence, there is neither need for tight synchronizations (extra overhead)
nor new interfaces.
Game theory provides tools that offer significant insight into the dynamics of nonco-
operation. It is a promising approach for studying mathematical models of conflict
and cooperation between rational decision makers [12]. It has been recently ap-
plied in telecommunication field and has been established as an important tool for
modelling interactions and DSA techniques for evolving technologies like cognitive
radio (CR) or inter-operator spectrum sharing.
The studied spectrum allocation problem is related to the frequency assignment
problem [13], where a carrier is either used or not. Following the carrier selec-
tion approach, two algorithms are developed for dynamic spectrum sharing based
on noncooperative repeated games. In this, operators adopt an interactive mode
of communication and agree upon formulating a policy on how to share carriers
amongst them. Due to the fact that operators coexist in the same geographical area
for a long time, they interact and build response sequences through a trust game.
Interaction is modelled in terms of spectrum usage favors being asked or received
by them. The favors are referred to utilization of shared frequency carriers.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the
utility criterion for resource allocation. It also discusses game theory and its models.
5In Chapter 3, the related work pertaining to inter-operator spectrum sharing are
presented. Besides that, standards closely related to spectrum sharing are also dis-
cussed.
In Chapter 4, inter-operator cooperation has been discussed, and its advantages and
challenges are presented. The system model used for the cooperative schemes is re-
viewed, and the implementation is analyzed mathematically.
In Chapter 5, the proposed DSA scheme based on noncooperative repeated games
and virtual carrier pricing is explained. The system model and the utility func-
tions are described alongside its optimization criteria. Finally, an algorithm for
distributed dynamic spectrum sharing among the operators is explained.
In Chapter 6, another distributed noncooperative game theoretic scheme is proposed
using mutual history of gains/losses incurred between the participating operators.
The system model, utility functions and algorithm are explained. Detailed mathe-
matical analysis is presented to corroborate the algorithm.
In Chapter 7, simulation results are presented and analyzed. The simulated scenario,
simulation parameters, user distributions, and channel models are explained. The
benefits of the proposed DSA schemes are then assessed, comparing to static alloca-
tion schemes such as orthogonal, full spectrum allocations and a cooperative scheme.
Finally, in the last chapter, conclusions are drawn and future work is suggested.
62 Background
In this chapter, inter-operator spectrum sharing is considered with the aid of the
literature discussions. Inter-operator spectrum sharing opens opportunities for the
operators to enhance the system level performance. To describe the operator specific
performance, we consider performance metric in the form of utility functions. To
describe interactions between the operators, we use the theory of games. So, this
chapter provides an overview of utility functions and game theory background.
2.1 Utility Criterion for Resource Allocation
Utility-based approaches have recently been widely adopted to quantify the radio
resource allocation problems in wireless communication. Utility function represents
the system’s performance level or QoS [14]. The composition of a utility function
is strictly non-decreasing (monotonic) and concave function of system parameters.
The function describing the system-wide utility and welfare functions studied in
economic sciences bears the same characteristics.
Though utility functions have been used to model various performance parame-
ters such as data traffic (Shannon capacity) [15], bandwidth allocation [16, 17],
multiuser diversity [18], scheduling/delay-tolerant traffic [19, 20], signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR)/signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) improvement, bandwidth
pricing applications [21–23], fairness [24, 25], bit error rate (BER), energy effi-
ciency [26], sigmoid-like function of SINR [27,28] etc. But in the thesis, we focus on
the study consisting of fairness in system capacity based utility which can be best
described in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Example of utility function behaviour
7Assume a load of L = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} users in the wireless network. The resources
are quantified based on user preferences such as SINR, or throughput, or allocated
bandwidth etc. The associated utility function can be expressed as U (xi (t)), where
xi (t) denotes the user specific quantity, such as experienced user rate of the i-th
user at time t and U is a function that describes the user satisfaction level, given a
quantity. The utility function U (xi (t)) is an increasing and strictly concave function
representing the decreasing additional benefits with increasing resource allocation.
From user’s satisfaction perspective, networks are interested in optimizing a resource
allocation r, e.g., carrier allocations, within the resource constraint set R, which
maximizes the long term expected aggregated utility,
max
r∈R
lim
T →∞
1
T Er

T∫
0
∑
i∈n
U (xi (t)) dt
 . (2.1)
The solution to Eq. (2.1) is called the socially optimal solution. If the RAN and
the available resources (e.g., a fixed maximum transmit power constraint at the base
station (BS), available bandwidth etc.) are static, and the user’s QoS measurements
are independent of time (e.g., a user’s SINR), then Eq. (2.1) can be written as
max
r∈R
∑
i∈n
U (xi)
without time t.
A solution that maximizes the sum-throughput utility of all the players might not be
practicable, as some of the players might consider it unfair in the sense that such a
solution is achieved at the expense of some players. In many environments fairness
might be more important than optimality. Various definitions of fair allocations have
been proposed, such as weighted fair [29], max-min fair (MMF) [30], proportional
fair (PF) allocations [14, 31], etc. Based on various fairness criteria, the utility
function can be written as
U(xi) =

wi
1− αx
1−α
i , weighted α-fairness, (2.2a)
α > 0,weights (wi) ≥ 0
xi, Max (2.2b)
lim
α→∞
1
1− αx
1−α
i , MMF (2.2c)
log (xi) , PF. (2.2d)
The weighted α-fair allocations are a parameterized family of fairness criteria. In
Eq. (2.2a), if wi = 1 and α → 0 then α-fair regains the max-throughput opti-
mization. The max or greedy fairness criterion maximizes the network throughput.
The disadvantage of such an allocation is that users with poor channel conditions
is starved of resources, which seems somewhat unfair. It would seem fairer, for all
8users simultaneously have some access to the network s resources. If max-throughput
is unfair then, perhaps, MMF is the most fair. Amongst all rate allocations, the
minimum rate allocated to any flow is maximized over all possible rate allocations,
and eventually leading to equal rates for all users. In Eq. (2.2a), if wi = 1 and
α → ∞ then the weighted α-fair allocations reduces to MMF allocations. PF is
a compromise-based scheduling algorithm. It is based upon maintaining a balance
between two competing interests, trying to maximize network throughput while at
the same time allowing all users at least a minimal level of service. In Eq. (2.2a),
for α = 1, the weighted α-fair objective is not defined, but limα→1 reduces to PF
allocation. It is important to remark that achieving a fair allocation and achieving
a socially optimal allocation do not always conflict with each other, and sometimes
both objectives can be achieved by choosing the appropriate utility functions (e.g.,
[31, 32]).
With utility-based framework, a network can be modelled using a single function and
the network resource allocation problems can be studied in a noncomplex way. The
performance of different allocation schemes can be easily compared, e.g., how far
they are from the socially optimal solution, or the upper limit of resource usage. It
also aids in examining the trade-off between social optimality, and other performance
objectives.
2.2 Introduction to Game Theory
Game theory [12] is concerned with predicting the outcome of games of strategies.
Expressed succinctly, game theory is the formal study of decision-making where it
analyzes or models the interactions between interdependent decision-making entities
that have mutual and possibly conflicting objectives.
Developed since the first half of the 20th century, it has been used primarily in
economics as it is to describing animal behaviour and model competition between
companies, and is central to the understandings of various other fields, such as
political sciences, psychology, logic and biology. In recent years, telecommunications
is one of the new fields that has evolved an emerging interest towards game theory
as a tool to analyze conflicts among players, e.g., congestion control, routing, power
control, topology control, trust management, dynamic spectrum sharing, etc. The
importance of modelling interaction via game-theoretic approach is multifold -
• Offers a wide range of optimality criteria (e.g., in simultaneous, multistage
games),
• Optimizes problems where no centralized control is present (noncooperative
games),
• Players devise strategies independently and intelligently, and give a power
to make decisions locally (noncooperative one-shot games, noncooperative re-
9peated games). With good strategic mechanism players can enforce others to
cooperate in noncooperative environment (noncooperative repeated games).
2.2.1 Game Definition
A game is typically formalized as a triple of a set of players, a set of allowable strate-
gies for each player, and a utility function. Utility function represents a player’s
evaluation of consequences in a game. Players play strategies with the intention
to maximize their utilities. Normally the strategies are conflicting, i.e., increasing
own utility happens at the expense of other’s decreasing utility. So, the players
have to be rational while playing strategies as too much greedy approach can harm
themselves because of repercussions and too much of trustworthiness can let their
exploitations by greedy opponents.
Representing mathematically, game G,
G = 〈P ,S, U〉 ,
where
• P is a finite set of players, s.t., P = {1, 2, 3, ...,m},
• S is an m-tuple of pure strategy sets, one for each player, s.t., S = {s1, s2, s3, ...
, sm}, where si is the strategy profile of i-th player, s.t., si ∈ Si and Si is finite
number of allowable strategy set of i-th player, Si = {1, ..., qi},
• U is the utility function, whose intended interpretation is the award given to
a single player at the outcome of the game, s.t., U : S1 × S2 × ...× Sm → R.
2.2.2 Game Strategies Type
With different type of strategies, players can obtain various game resolutions - dif-
ferent equilibriums, optimal/suboptimal solution, etc. In this section, we outline the
possible strategies describing their behaviour and possible outcome on the game G.
• Mixed (Randomized) Strategy
A mixed strategy for player i, with Si = {1, ..., qi} is a probability distribution
over Si. In other words, pi : Si → [0, 1], where we have pi(si) ≥ 0 for all si ∈ Si
and
∑
si∈Si
pi (si) = 1, i.e.,
pi (1) + pi (2) + ...+ pi (qi) = 1.
We interpret pi(si) as the probability with which player i chooses startegy si.
• Pure Strategy
If in the mixed strategy, the probability associated to si = si (j) for some j
is 1, i.e., pi(si(j)) = 1, where 1 ≤ si(j) ≤ qi, while for others is 0, then it is
called pure strategy.
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• Strictly Dominant Strategy
A strategy s∗i ∈ Si is a strictly dominant strategy to a given startegy s′i ∈ Si
for player i if ∀s−i ∈ S−i, we have,
Ui (s
∗
i , s−i) > Ui
(
s
′
i, s−i
)
.
In this case, we say that s∗i strictly dominates s
′
i.
• Weakly Dominant Strategy
For any player i, a strategy s∗i ∈ Si weakly dominates another strategy s′i ∈ Si
if ∀s−i ∈ S−i,
Ui (s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Ui
(
s
′
i, s−i
)
.
• Maxmin Strategy
Player i plays strategy si ∈ Si to the s−i ∈ S−i in order maximize its minimum
utility,
max
si
min
s−i
Ui (si, s−i) .
• Best Response
A strategy s∗i ∈ Si is a best response for player i to s−i ∈ S−i if ∀si ∈ Si,
Ui (s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Ui (si, s−i) .
Note - best response is different from dominant strategy in a way that best
response improves utility for a specific strategy s−i ∈ S−i and ∀si ∈ Si, whereas
dominant strategy improves utility to a given strategy s
′
i ∈ Si and ∀s−i ∈ S−i.
• Mixed Nash Equilibrium (mixed NE)
For a strategic game G, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3, ..., s∗m) ∈ S is a mixed
NE if for every player i, s∗i is a best response to s
∗
−i ∈ S−i. In other words, for
every player i = 1, ...,m and for every mixed strategy si ∈ Si,
Ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
) ≥ Ui (si, s∗−i) . (2.3)
In other words, no player can improve its own utility by unilaterally deviating
from the mixed strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3, ..., s
∗
m).
• Pure Nash Equilibrium (Pure NE)
Strategy profile s∗ satisfying Eq. (2.3) in addition is called a pure NE if every
s∗i is a pure strategy s
∗
i = s
∗
i (j), for some j ∈ Si.
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• Subgame Perfect Nash Equillibrium (SPNE)
A strategy profile s is a SPNE if it represents a NE of every subgame of
the original game G. A subgame is a subset of any game that includes an
initial node (which has to be independent from any information set) and all
its successor nodes.
• Pareto Optimal
A game G strategy profile s = (s1, s2, s3, ..., sm) is said to be Pareto optimal if
we cannot find another strategy profile s in which it is impossible to make any
one player better off without making at least one player worse off. Essentially,
it is often treated as a weak efficient solution for the optimization problems
beacuse a socially optimal solution is Pareto optimal, but the vice versa is not
always true. For example, if each Ui (xi (t)) is monotonic and strictly concave
in xi (t), and resource constraint set W = {x|
∑
i∈m xi ≤ X}, where xi (t)
denotes the QoS measurements of the i-th user at time t, then any resource
allocation w ∈ W achieves ∑i∈m xi = X is Pareto optimal, but there is only
one socially optimal solution.
• Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
A pair of utilities
(
U∗i , U
∗
−i
)
is a NBS if it solves the following optimization
problem,
max
Ui,U−i
(Ui − di) (U−i − d−i)
subject to (Ui, U−i) ∈ U
(Ui, U−i) ≥ (di, d−i) ,
where di and d−i, are the status quo utilities (i.e., the utility are not meant
for bargain with the other player). The NBS should satisfy certain axioms:
- Invariant to affine transformations or Invariant to equivalent utility rep-
resentations
- Pareto optimality
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Symmetry
• Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg model can be solved to find the SPNE. Assume there are two
players, player i act as a leader and player −i its follower. To find the SPNE
of the game we need to use backward induction, as in any sequential game.
Starting from the end (2nd stage), player −i (follower) makes reactive choices
depending on the actions of player i,
sf−i (si) = arg max
s−i
U−i (s−i, si) .
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In the 1st stage, player i (leader) always anticipate its rival behaviour initially,
makes its strategic choices accordingly,
sli = arg max
si
Ui
(
si, s
f
−i (si)
)
.
So, the Stackelberg equilibrium or SPNE strategies are
(
sli, s
f
−i
)
.
2.2.3 Game Model Classification
In the game formulation, players act rationally according to their strategies with
an objective to maximize their outcome. However, the strategic profile of players is
highly influenced by the regulation imposed by the nature of the environment of the
game. This led to the proliferation of varieties of the game with possible taxonomies
are:
• One-shot vs. Repeated Game
One-shot game is also known as non-repeated or single stage game. It is played
only once; therefore stakes are high but carries no further repercussions. Here,
players may be uninformed about the moves made by other players and might
act selfishly to get away with the highest payoff. If a game is not played once,
but numerous times then the game is called a repeated game. It allows for
a strategy to be contingent on past moves, and have reputation effects and
retribution for it. Repeated game is further classified as finitely and infinitely
repeated game, but widely studied repeated game is an infinitely repeated
game. According to the Folk Theorem, for an infinite repeated game there
exists a discount factor δ̂ < 1 such that any feasible and individually rational
payoff can arise as an equilibrium payoff for any discount factor δ ∈
(
δ̂, 1
)
.
Thus, future payoffs are discounted and are less valuable. This is because the
consumption in the future is considered less valuable than the present due to
time preference (e.g., money). Therefore, the player’s total payoff in a repeated
game is a discounted sum of each stage payoff. The repeated game holds a
variety of equilibrium properties because the threat of retaliation is real due
to the repetitive nature of the game and also it has a much bigger strategy
space than the one-shot game. Unlike one-shot game, here players can punish
hostile players using tit-for-tat strategy [33,34]. A repeated game with perfect
monitoring where players’ actions are observable is called a multistage game.
In this, players announce their strategy publicly and thus, each stage of a
multistage game resembles a single stage game.
• Cooperative vs. Noncooperative Game
A cooperative game is defined where group of players enforces cooperative be-
haviour on each other. In this, players bargain or negotiate on payoffs and form
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joint strategies. Cooperative game is pragmatically undesirable because of ex-
cessive overhead signalling and trust issues, but it provides a unique Pareto
optimal solution for the problem modelling. In the latter, if the competition
is between potentially conflicting and self-interested players, then the corre-
sponding game is known as noncooperative game. In a noncooperative game,
without centralized control, the players do not cooperate or make deals so that
any cooperation among them must be self-enforcing.
2.2.4 Prisoner’s Dilemma Example
The prisoner’s dilemma is probably the most widely used game for pedagogical pur-
poses in game theory. Nicknamed in 1950 by Albert W. Tucker, prisoner’s dilemma
describes a situation where two prisoners are taken into custody in connection with
a burglary. However, the authorities possess insufficient evidence to convict them
for their crime, only to convict them on the charge of possession of stolen goods.
This game is summarized in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Prisoner’s dilemma game
Description
If prisoners help each other by not confessing the crime, they will both be charged
with the lesser prison term of a year each. The authorities will question them in
separate interrogation rooms, which mean that the prisoners take decisions simul-
taneously and they do not know about each other’s decision. Thus, the process
is noncooperative with imperfect information. The authorities will try to convince
each prisoner to confess their crime by offering him an escape clause and to his ac-
complice a prison term of ten years. If both prisoners defect and confess their crime,
they shall be sentenced to eight years. Both prisoners have a common knowledge
of the same offered deal along with its consequences, but completely unaware of
each other’s choices. In this, the prison term can be seen as the respective utilities
14
(negative of prison terms) for each set of choices, and each would like to have largest
utility for himself.
Prisoner’s Choices
As the game carries no further repercussions, prisoners are tempted to get away
with largest profit (least prison term) and consequently, will defect. Therefore, “to
confess” is the dominant strategy, thus (Noncooperation, Noncooperation) is the NE
in this one-shot game.
Let us assume, the two burglars work together over a long time, and repeatedly end
up being interrogated by the police, and punished by prison terms. After each round
(stage) of interrogation, and based on their choices, they get to know what others
did. Again, prisoners would like to have maximum sum-utility (minimal prison
terms) for their repeated criminal acts. So, thinking rationally, it makes sense to
cooperate over all the stages, to have maximum profit in a repeated sense of game
(smaller prison term of one year is given every time for their crimes). Let us say,
prisoner P1 wants to defect, and no doubt he can get away with zero prison term in
that stage, whereas prisoner P2 will be awarded ten years of prison term. Beside,
prisoner P2 will get aware of the last hostile choice made by prisoner P1, and later
he will defect too, in order to punish prisoner P1 for his noncooperation. If they
continue with their noncooperative behaviour, then both will always get eight years
of prison term for every subsequent crime. Therefore, in repeated games, “to lie” is
the dominant strategy, thus (Cooperation, Cooperation) is the NE as it maximizes
the profit by getting aware of others’ strategies and punishing them with tit-for-tat
strategy [33,34] if somebody does not cooperate.
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3 Research Work and Standards for Spectrum Shar-
ing
3.1 Related Work
Traditional channel allocation algorithms aim to improve carrier usage for a sin-
gle system (e.g., cellular systems, femtocells deployments, etc.). In essence, these
algorithms realize inter-operator spectrum sharing needs provided that operators
with neighbouring RANs are willing to work together. The spectrum sharing al-
gorithms can be classified on the knowledge of the domain where inter-operator
interference is handled, i.e., frequency, time and/or spatial domain. Further, there
are two extremes in regard to the cooperative arrangement between the operators
in distributed inter-operator spectrum sharing depending on whether the operators
cooperate with each other or not. On one hand, the operators may behave in a to-
tally selfish manner and respond to the opponents by using the sequence of the best
responses. On the other hand, the operators may be honest and fully cooperative.
Cooperative Games
In [35], autonomous component carrier selection scheme is proposed, a distributed
solution to the cross-tier interference management for HetNet. The BSs exchange
binary interference matrix (BIM) entries representing a single value over the entire
bandwidth encapsulating the information of outgoing and incoming inter-cell inter-
ference reduction. BSs select the primary component carriers (PCCs) based on their
coverage (maximum path loss), whereas secondary component carriers (SCCs) are
selected based on BIMs exchanged. In [36], BSs select carriers if the corresponding
capacity gain on its served user equipments (UEs) is greater than the losses of the
neighbouring BSs. However, the network suffers from many carrier re-selections.
In [37], a dynamic carrier selection scheme is proposed using BIM per component
carrier instead of full bandwidth (as in [35]), and avoids carrier re-selections by
estimating capacity gains and losses. In [38], the interference condition is commu-
nicated in the form of interference prices instead of BIMs. An upper bound on the
sum-capacity of two operators is identified in [39] assuming that operators exchange
their user-specific channel quality indicators over all shared channels. In [40], a re-
peated game Cournot model for the cooperative spectrum sensing in CR is presented
in which multiple secondary users (SUs) share spectrum with a primary user (PU)
through a bidding process using a determined spectrum pricing functions set by PU.
In time domain spectrum sharing, the operators could, for instance, trade time
slots [41,42]. Operators with a low load could borrow their time resources to heav-
ily loaded operators helping them to reduce the blocking probability and frame
delay [42]. This scheme improves spectrum utilization efficiency at the cost of high
signalling overhead and a good time synchronization requirement among operators.
For higher efficiency, one could also allow UEs connecting to the “best BS” whether
it belongs to their home network or not provided that all operators utilize the same
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RAT [43].
Inter-operator spectrum sharing in the spatial domain has been considered in [44,45],
modelling each operator by a transmitter-receiver link. In [44], operators use inter-
operator interference as a bargaining value to enable cooperation, and compute their
beam-forming vectors. With cooperative beam-forming, operators increase their
system throughput by lowering the overall inter-operator interference. In [45], op-
erators exchange their CSI, and utilize cooperative transmit beam-forming to steer
their beams towards the desired receiver.
Besides spectrum utilization efficiency, cooperative algorithms for inter-operator
spectrum sharing could jointly maximize a function that incorporates the utility
function of each operator. In [46], the sum-utility is maximized by properly dis-
tributing the available power budget across multiple carriers. Joint power control
and scheduling (as an operator may want to favor users based on their channel condi-
tions) are identified in [38] for maximizing the sum-PF utility. In [37], multiple cells
exchange interference prices, and partition the spectrum so that the sum-utility is
maximized. Unfortunately, the cooperation mechanism forces each operator/link to
reveal its network-specific information, e.g., how much interference it receives in the
form of interference prices, or may be the utilities, channel state information (CSI)
information, load, etc. The method can also be generalized where operators cooper-
ate with each other for maximizing their sum-operator utility. In practice operators
are expected to have some elements of selfish behaviour, and may send malicious
information to others (e.g., falsified interference prices, erroneous gains/losses over
the component carriers, etc.) in order to get a higher share of available resources.
Fully-cooperative inter-operator spectrum sharing schemes cannot be used unless
there is a mechanism to identify and punish the non-trustworthy parties.
Noncooperative One-shot Games
The study in [43] considers one-shot noncooperative games between multiple op-
erators where each operator is modelled by a single transmitter-receiver link. The
operators maximize their sum-rate over multiple carriers in a selfish manner. Since
the utility function (sum-rate) is concave, equilibrium exists, and the power alloca-
tion vector for each link at an equilibrium point is identified. Under certain con-
ditions, there is a unique equilibrium and noncooperative spectrum sharing game
becomes predictable. However, the equilibrium point in one-shot noncooperative
games could be inefficient for some if not for all of the players [47].
In the literature [43, 47], strict ways to apply punishment are considered where
resource allocations of one-shot noncooperative games are enforced after a player
deviates from cooperation. A common assumption in is that the one-shot games are
enforced forever so as no player has the incentive to deviate. This kind of strategy is
quite strict because it does not incorporate forgiveness and punishes all players even
if a single player deviates. Besides, the existing studies consider the power spectral
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density as the strategy space and optimize the power allocation over multiple carriers
for the different players/links/operators.
Noncooperative Repeated Games
Operators are expected to share spectrum a long time, and have persistent, known
identity. As a result, they can learn from each other’s behaviour, build reputa-
tions and achieve higher utility in comparison with one-shot selfish strategies. In
that case, the interaction between operators would rather be modelled by repeated
games among selfish players. Besides utility functions and strategy spaces used in
the cooperative game model, repeated games of selfish players require also a punish-
ment mechanism when a player deviates from the specified rules or mechanisms to
otherwise, specify reciprocity. In [48], a repeated game approach is used to improve
the inefficient NE of a one-shot game where it optimizes to eliminate the incentive
for deviation in the finite time interval. However, the cooperation strategy is arbi-
trarily set, i.e., orthogonal spectrum sharing is used, and the networks are assumed
to have complete information about each other’s parameters. Due to the fact that
operators in advance agree on orthogonal spectrum sharing, the finite punishment
period introduces forgiveness and alleviates the demand for perfect detection accu-
racy.
Noncooperative repeated games have been considered for scenarios where the players
do not have equal rights, e.g., primary-secondary property rights model in spectrum
sharing. In [49], noncooperative repeated games are considered to model and ana-
lyze the competition among multiple SUs to access the PU’s channels. The spectrum
leasing process identified as a monopoly market in which the PU has the full control
over leasing process. The market is secondary driven where SUs act as relays with
their demand functions based on the acceptance probability model for the users.
NE is considered as the solution for this noncooperative game, where each SU tries
to maximize its payoff function in a selfish manner. The games are based on the
assumption that SUs are honest and will not cheat. Another game spectrum leasing
models considered in [50,51] consisting of multiple strategic PUs (as against the one
in [49]) and SUs. In this, the active trading of PUs’ spare radio resources with the
SUs’ stochastic demand is modelled using a Markov chain to describe SUs’ buying
opportunities from PUs. Both models behaviour are very similar in nature with
an only exception that [50] does not account the user’s wireless details. With the
existence of multiple sellers (PUs) and buyers (SUs); both groups’ participants try
to maximize their payoffs selfishly and the problem broken down to two different
problems: the buyers’ problem of revenue maximization and spectrum pricing, and
the sellers’ problem of spectrum access. For such active models, [50,51] use market-
equilibrium-based approaches to understand the behavioural economics behind it.
In [52], a competitive spectrum leasing model is presented where a central mediating
entity acts as a spectrum broker and distributes spectrum among different compet-
ing service providers through auctioning [53].
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In [54], fair resource allocation is realized in time domain using the game-theoretic
approach to enable concerned operators (auctioneers) maximize their respective rev-
enues alongside ensuring the maximization of user’s payoffs (throughput), as well.
The revenue here is defined as user’s quantitative measure of reservation preference
(of channel) upon time slots. In this approach, the second price auction mechanism
(Vickrey auctions) is employed where users bid for a wireless channel in the auction
competing for resources (securing time slots) for their throughput maximization.
Users with better channel coefficients have a better chance to secure the bid. The
bidding here is not related to the willingness to pay for the resources; it only acts as
a tool securing the possession of resources for the user with good channel conditions.
Most studies in noncooperative games [49–52] are bounded to centralized scenarios or
CR, where PU (or auctioneer) has full control over the information exchange about
the spectrum utilization state and negotiation on the spectrum allocation. Secondly,
market-driven mechanisms have been explored widely as a promising approach for
spectrum sharing where PUs trade unused spectrum to SUs dynamically. However,
operators favor decentralized resource management and, at the same time, are hesi-
tant in adopting market driven sharing schemes as they may not want to touch their
revenue model. Also, auction based spectrum access [52, 54] poses larger overhead
constraints, beside it might require the government’s nod in its adoption. There-
fore, operators are reluctant to engage in any kind of monetary payoffs, or auctioning
spectrum, or transferring load as discussed in the majority of the noncooperative
games and drive us to need for newer policies for modelling the noncooperative game
models for spectrum sharing.
3.2 Related Standards
Regulators, operators, suppliers, users of radio communication services and radio
equipment rely on technical standards to ensure that radio systems perform as de-
signed. From the spectrum use perspective, there are already some closely related
standards in existence for which we would like to discuss, and point out how they
differ from the inter-operator spectrum sharing needs in the following section.
3.2.1 802.11 for Intra-cell/Inter-cell Transmission
IEEE 802.11 [55] is a set of medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY)
specifications for implementing wireless local area network (WLAN) communication
in the 2.4, 3.6, 5 and 60 GHz frequency bands. To cope with special problems of wire-
less transmission in intra-cell/inter-cell data transmission, IEEE 802.11 MAC carries
two different access mechanisms, the mandatory distributed coordination function
(DCF) which provides distributed channel access based on CSMA/CA (carrier sense
multiple access with collision avoidance) and the optional point coordination func-
tion (PCF) which provides centrally controlled channel access through polling.
The 802.11 protocol can be employed to tackle the intra-cell/inter-cell transmission
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problems in the low-density setting. However, the performance of 802.11 to resolute
inter-operator transmission problems in an ultra-dense network (UDN) scenario is
no better than the already existing technologies, e.g., LTE small cell deployments.
In [56], an analysis is presented showing that LTE co-channel picocells offer a better
user experience and system capacity improvement than Wi-Fi nodes. In addition,
Wi-Fi nodes also lack better support for mobility/handoff, QoS, security and self-
organized networks. So, there is a need of a set of protocols or policies that cope
with wireless transmission issues in the multi-operator UDN system.
3.2.2 802.11h for Spectrum Management in 5 GHz Band
With an advent of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard, the persistent thrust to
open up spectrum for unlicensed use created a need for dynamic frequency selec-
tion (DFS). DFS is supported by the novel IEEE 802.11h [57] WLAN standard
which allows 5 GHz capable IEEE 802.11 devices to share spectrum with radar (or
satellite) devices without causing interference to the radar operation. The concept
of DFS is to have the unlicensed IEEE 802.11h device monitors the presence of a
radar/satellite on the channel it is using and, if the level of the radar is above a
certain threshold, the device vacates the existing channel, and then monitors and
selects another channel if no radar was detected.
This standard is different from the inter-operator spectrum sharing requirements in
the sense that only IEEE 802.11h device adjusts its spectrum needs in 5GHz band
via DFS in order to avoid co-channel operation with radar systems. Whereas in the
inter-operator spectrum sharing, multiple players share the spectrum dynamically,
and have equal rights on the same frequency bands at the same time.
3.2.3 802.16h for Improved Coexisting Mechanism
The task of inter-operator spectrum sharing necessitates the networks for peaceful
coexistence in the geographical area and formulates policies on the development.
The IEEE 802.16h [58] License-Exempt Task Group, a unit of IEEE 802.16 Broad-
band Wireless Access Standards Committee realizes improved mechanisms for time
domain spectrum sharing under the coordinated coexistence mode. It develops stan-
dards, e.g., MAC enhancements or policies, and recommended practices enabling
coexistence between license-exempt systems in wireless MAN. It also focuses in hi-
erarchical sharing spectrum applications of coexisting systems with primary radio
systems. The operation is not limited to license-exempt bands, but extending to all
bands where 802.16-2004 is applicable.
For the execution of spectrum sharing policies, a distributed architecture for radio
resource management is suggested (IEEE C802.16h-05/004) that enables communi-
cation and exchange of parameters between multiple networks formed by one 802.16
BS and its associated UEs. Each BS has a distributed radio resource manage-
ment (DRRM) entity and build up a database for sharing information related to
actual and intended future usage of radio spectrum. 802.16h protocol realizes all
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necessary functions required for spectrum sharing amongst coexisting systems, e.g.,
detecting the co-located RAN topology, registering to the DRRM database, or ne-
gotiation for radio spectrum sharing. While interacting with MAC or PHY, the
DRRM uses the coexistence protocol to communicate with other BSs and regional
license-exempt databases. In this manner, using the inter-system communication,
IEEE 802.16 protocol helps to achieve harmonious sharing of an unlicensed or shared
radio spectrum.
The IEEE 802.16h coexistence protocol works in time domain. However, because
of the tight requirements for a good time synchronicity between the operators; the
coexistence is wished in frequency domain, and in that case the standard IEEE
802.16h fails to serve the purpose.
3.2.4 802.22 for using White Spaces in the TV Frequency Spectrum
The development of the IEEE 802.22 [59] wireless regional area network (WRAN)
standard aims at opportunistic use of white spaces using CR techniques. White
spaces refer to geographically unused spectrum made available for use at loca-
tions where spectrum is not being used by TV broadcasting services. IEEE 802.22
WRANs are designed to operate in the VHF and UHF TV broadcast bands on a
non-interfering basis, and to bring broadband access to hard-to-reach low popula-
tion density areas, for e.g., rural environments up to 100 km from the transmitter.
Each WRAN will boost up a connection speed up to 22 Mbps per channel with no
harmful interference to the existing TV broadcast stations. Therefore, it has timely
potential for a worldwide applicability.
The IEEE 802.22 standard is intended for centralized inter-network resource sharing
and targets typical centralized scenario that enables SUs to reuse unused spectrum
of PU. On the contrary, in non-centralized scenarios without a central co-ordinator,
this standard is not well established and push for the need of more versatile inter-
operator spectrum sharing standards for non-centralized distributed implementa-
tions.
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4 Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
Cooperative spectrum sharing can effectively improve spectrum efficiency, and thus
mitigate the network congestion or the wasteful usage of spectrum resources. Coop-
erative schemes are largely desirable in the trustworthy networks, and where extra
signalling overheads are not an issue. The network resources can be effectively
utilized by implementing cooperative schemes in the cellular systems within an op-
erator. In this chapter, we discuss the notion behind cooperative spectrum sharing
and investigate it mathematically as it provides us benchmark studies for hence-
forth discussed noncooperative spectrum sharing techniques for non-trusted and
self-interested network operators.
The cooperative communications amongst players can be realized in many ways - in
time [41, 42, 60, 61], frequency [35, 37–40, 46, 61–64], code [65], or spatial [45, 66–69]
domain. In [67], the network players exploit space diversity, and whenever a player
encounters poor channel access conditions, it relays its data to the other player’s
Figure 4.1: Operators share spectrum in a cooperative manner
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network which acts as cooperative relays. In [68] the benefit of MIMO communi-
cations has been studied by using cooperative players as relay nodes. In [61, 65],
cooperative game theory has been used to analyze the interference channel. Problem
of opportunistic spectrum access has been addressed in [63] using cooperative game
theory. The author showed that the NBS achieves the best trade-off between fair-
ness and optimality in spectrum allocation. Distributed power control for cognitive
radio network (CRN) has been analyzed in [64] based on cooperative game theory.
In [69], a cooperative auction based algorithm is introduced for relay assignment
and allocate relay transmit power among bidding users, for which the unique NE is
achieved distributively via globally updating the best response bid in a completely
asynchronous manner¬.
With a brief review of cooperation algorithms in the field of telecommunication, we
henceforth model and investigate the cooperation phenomena in spectrum sharing,
in detail. The motivation behind the following investigative study is [36,37], in which
operators exchange interference prices and distribute spectrum resources amongst
them by estimating their utility gain/loss and jointly making the decisions so that
their sum-utility is maximized.
4.1 System Model
We consider operators Oi and O−i sharing same spectrum, e.g., in a shopping mall
scenario. Assume that each operator can construct a number that characterizes
the level of service enjoyed by the users served by the operator. Such a number is
here called a network utility. It may, e.g., be defined in terms of the distribution of
the service provided to users, such as a suitable linear combination of average cell
throughput and cell edge throughput. In a cooperative scheme, it is crucial that
all operators have the same utility function. For simplicity, we will assume utility
functions that are directly formed from the throughputs enjoyed by the user. Then,
the operators schedule their users to the available carriers and jointly maximize,
e.g., the sum-PF rate function with weights reflecting the portion of time a user is
multiplexed onto a carrier. An algorithm to approximate the cooperative optimal
solution is detailed in [36,37] and it is shortly summarized next. Fig. 4.1 illustrates
the given cooperative scenario.
Let us assume that each user can measure the interference levels due to transmis-
sions originated from other operator and report them to its serving BS. As the
operators here are assumed to use the same spectrum, the ability to measure the
interference levels originating from the BS of another operator would be a straight
forward generalization of LTE handover measurements. By aggregating such mea-
surements performed by the users, operator Oi can form an approximation of the
level of interference caused by a BS of operator O−i, following example the principles
outlined in [35]. The BS of an operator, e.g., operator Oi, asks its users to conduct
¬For additional information on related work, please refer Chapter 3 Section 3.1.
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spectrum measurements over all the carriers utilized by the operator. On receiving
the measurement information, operator Oi computes for each carrier its utility gain
(if the users of operator O−i currently use the carrier, they stop using it) or its
utility loss (if the users of operator O−i start using the carrier) and communicates
gain/loss to operator O−i. Operator O−i in its turn, selects randomly a carrier:
(i) if it uses the carrier, it compares its loss (by removing the carrier) to the gain
operator Oi would achieve (ii) if it does not use the carrier, it compares its gain
(by start using the carrier) to the loss operator Oi would experience. Operator O−i
makes the decision that increases the sum of the utilities of the two operators (a.k.a.
cooperative utility). For the new carrier allocation, operator O−i computes its own
utility gain/loss, communicates them to operator Oi, and the interaction continues
until the cooperative utility cannot further increase by changing the carrier alloca-
tion between the operators. Note that the identification of spectrum allocation and
user multiplexing weights across the carriers is a mixed integer programming prob-
lem. Approximations to the optimal solution can also be achieved in a centralized
manner, but the computational complexity grows quickly for an increasing number
of carriers and users. Natural solutions for mixed integer programming problems
are iterative, and the protocol depicted above uses a natural distribution of these
iterations to the independent decision makers in the problem here, i.e., the operator
networks.
4.2 Cooperative Algorithm
The discussed algorithm in the form of pseudocode is summarised as below,
Algorithm Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
1: Operator Oi, i ∈ I considers carrier k ∈ K for the dynamic selection.
2: Add unused carrier k by operator Oi.
Calculates utility gain Gi,k for added carrier k.
Compares it with utility loss L−i,k of other operator O−i.
if Gi,k > L−i,k then
do START using carrier k.
end if
3: Remove used carrier k by operator Oi.
Calculates utility loss Li,k for removed carrier k.
Compares it with utility gain G−i,k of other operator O−i.
if Li,k < G−i,k then
do STOP using carrier k.
end if
4: go to 1, and repeat until convergence is achieved.
4.3 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, we will present the mathematical analysis dealing with cooperative
game between the operators with varying interference conditions and load factor.
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For the sake of simplicity, we construct the following assumptions in order to get an
insight of the behaviour of the algorithm -
• There are two operators Oa and Ob, each have a BS, and a load Na and Nb
respectively,
• All users within the BS’s access area experience the same SINR/SNR over the
carrier components. With this, scheduling weights are same (wn,k = 1/load),
• No shadowing has been considered; therefore, user rates are function of only
distance-dependent path loss,
• Operators follow PF utility measure (∑n log rn, where rn is the user rate of
n-th user in the operator’s access area).
We assume that both operators start with orthogonal sharing, and we show that
under -
• Low Interference; both operators tend to share full spectrum,
• High Interference, and with asymmetric loads; both operators tend to share
the spectrum orthogonally with high load operator utilizing more component
carriers than low load operator,
• High Interference, and with symmetric loads; both operators tend to share the
spectrum orthogonally with an equal carrier allocation.
4.3.1 Orthogonal Spectrum Sharing
Let operators Oa and Ob have respective load Na and Nb. Both operators were ini-
tially sharing the spectrum orthogonally, each were having equal and non-overlapping
K/2 carriers allocation and thus no inter-operator interference was generated. For
PF measure, the utility for operator Oa with orthogonal carrier allocation, Uo,a can
be read as
Uo,a =
Na∑
n=1
log
(
Ka∑
k=1
wn,klog2 (1 + γn,k)
)
.
As per assumptions and initial conditions, Uo,a can be written as
Uo,a = Na log
(
K
2
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
, (4.1)
where γa is the SNR
­ of the users in operator Oa.
­As each operator has a single BS, and according to the assumption, SNR is same for all
component carriers for all users within an operator.
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Similarly, for operator Ob, utility Uo,b is,
Uo,b = Nb log
(
K
2
1
Nb
log2 (1 + γb)
)
. (4.2)
4.3.2 Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
Operator Oa has higher load than operator Ob, Na  Nb. Under asymmetric load
it is beneficial (in a cooperative sense) that operator Oa uses more carriers than
operator Ob. If high load operator Oa cooperatively agreeing with operator Ob to
switch on one of its unused carriers, the utility for operator Oa, i.e., Uc,a, becomes,
Uc,a = Na log
(
K
2
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa) +
1
Na
log2
(
1 + γ
′
a
))
,
where γ
′
a is the new SINR corresponding to ki-th carrier which both operators use
at the same time in the same vicinity and generate inter-operator interference to
each other, and all the other symbols have usual meanings. As a result the utility
gain for operator Oa is, Ga = Uc,a − Uo,a,
Ga = Na log
((
K
2
)
log2 (1 + γa) + log2
(
1 + γ
′
a
)(
K
2
)
log2 (1 + γa)
)
.
Similarly, for operator Ob, utility Uc,b is,
Uc,b = Nb log
((
K
2
− 1
)
1
Nb
log2 (1 + γb) +
1
Nb
log2
(
1 + γ
′
b
))
,
and the respective utility loss Lb = Uo,b − Uc,b,
Lb = Nb log
( (
K
2
)
log2 (1 + γb)(
K
2
− 1) log2 (1 + γb) + log2 (1 + γ′b)
)
.
Let us define the ratio of rates with and without interference, R = log2(1+γ
′)
log2(1+γ)
, R < 1
(because SNR γ > SINR γ
′
and signal power > noise power, i.e., γ > 1) and re-write
the gain/loss as
Ga = Na log
(
1 + 2
Ra
K
)
,
Lb = Nb log
(
1 + 2
(Rb − 1)
K
)−1
.
The cooperative utility (sum of the operators’ utilities) increases, if Ga > Lb. The
necessary condition is,
Na log
(
1 + 2
Ra
K
)
> Nb log
(
1 + 2
(Rb − 1)
K
)−1
,
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(
1 +
2Ra
K
)Na(
1 +
2 (Rb − 1)
K
)Nb
> 1. (4.3)
Similarly, in an unideal case, if low load operator Ob switches on one of its unused
carriers from the initial equal orthogonal carrier allocation, then the condition is,(
1 +
2 (Ra − 1)
K
)Na(
1 +
2Rb
K
)Nb
> 1. (4.4)
1. Under low interference, both Ra and Rb approaches one because SINR γ
′
tends to be SNR γ. Therefore, both Eq. (4.3) and (4.4) are satisfied and both
operators start using the unused carriers and share the full spectrum.
2. Under high interference, interference power becomes significant and tends to
lie closer to the signal power. Thus, SINR γ
′
tends to be 1, and consequently,
Ra → 1/log2 (1 + γa) and Rb → 1/log2 (1 + γb) (because log2(1 + γ′) ≈ log22),
which implies that, Ra < 1 and Rb < 1. Therefore, in Eq. (4.3), the component
(1 + 2Ra/K) > 1, whereas (1 + 2(Rb − 1)/K) < 1, and with Na >> Nb, the
left hand side of Eq. (4.3) becomes greater than one and the inequality satisfies.
On the other hand, in Eq. (4.4), (1 + 2(Ra − 1)/K) < 1 and (1 + 2Rb/K) > 1,
and with Na << Nb, the left hand side of Eq. (4.4) becomes less than one and
the inequality does not satisfy. It implies that under high interference high
load operator gets more orthogonal carriers than low load operator as long as
their sum-operator utility increases.
3. With equal load, i.e., Na ≈ Nb = N , we can assume Ra ≈ Rb = R, and on that
account, both Eq. (4.3) and (4.4) describing the spectrum sharing conditions
reduce to a single conditon, and is independent of load, accordingly,(
1 + 2
R
K
)(
1 + 2
(R− 1)
K
)
> 1. (4.5)
Under high interference (i.e., R = 1/log2 (1 + γ), R < 1), there must be no
transference of carriers because loads are equal and the operators must remain
as it is as they started initially with an equal orthogonal carrier allocation.
Therefore, from Eq. (4.5), the condition to remain in orthogonal sharing can
be obtained as (
1 + 2
R
K
)(
1 + 2
(R− 1)
K
)
< 1.
So, the condition to remain in equal orthogonal share at high interference is,
2R (R− 1)
K
+ 2R− 1 < 0. (4.6)
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For a large number of carriers (K), the necessary condition obtained from
Eq. (4.6) is, R < 0.5, becomes γ > 3 or 4.77 dB. In the limiting case with
K = 2 and the necessary condition (R < 0.618) becomes γ > 2.07 or 3.15 dB.
As a result, with high inter-operator interference, and for any number of channels,
operator with a low load abandons carriers provided that the SNR is higher than
4.77 dB.
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5 Repeated Games using Virtual Carrier Price
for Spectrum Sharing
Operators may not be willing to share their performance over the different parts of
the spectrum, nor willing to decide invariably in favor of cooperative utility. In this
sense, a cooperative game model does not describe the interactions between opera-
tors in a realistic manner. Instead, interaction between operators could be modelled
as noncooperative games. The operators are assumed to interact for long periods
of time, and have a well-defined and publicly known identity. Accordingly, an ap-
propriate framework is that of repeated games. We assume that each operator has
a carrier allocation strategy where it acts based on predetermined rules. One-shot
games are not considered in our study as they can result in poor performance for
some if not for all of the players [47].
In this chapter, we model noncooperative repeated games using virtual carrier pric-
ing based utility for inter-operator spectrum sharing. In this, operators estimate
their utility gain distributively for a new carrier allocation strategy. For instance,
in downlink transmission, the operator can ask its UEs to measure the carrier uti-
lization and interference levels, and report them to the home BS. The operator uses
this information to analyze its carrier allocation strategy in which it uses its own
unused carrier, or may ask the opponent to stop using it. The operators interact and
approve each other carrier allocation strategies if they see utility improvement for
themselves. The operators are self-interested; therefore, they scrutinize their mutual
interaction in terms of spectrum usage favors given to each other. Finally, the lat-
ter chapter presents the simulation results for the proposed model and assesses its
performance against the traditional allocation schemes and cooperative algorithm.
5.1 System Description
We propose a dynamic spectrum sharing method in which the operators actively
attempt to share its spectrum with the other operators in the downlink based on
some policy. Obviously, leasing would mean that the lessee operator system will
have to pay certain compensation to the lessor (owner) operator for this additional
spectrum. However, instead of monetary compensation for the gained spectrum us-
age, operators keep track of their mutual spectrum transactions and can ask each
other for their fair due based on their mutual history in demanding situations. As
operators’ identities are publicly known, they strive to behave honestly.
We consider a geographical area served by the number of operators, with their RANs
having a connection with each other. For the discussion, the operators are consid-
ered as a single cell operator. The set of operators is denoted by, I = {1, 2, 3.....I}.
The BS distributes the K carriers amongst the J users according to their CSI and
fairness.
The total available spectrum (K carriers) in the given geographical area is divided
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into two different allocations, namely, (i) Fixed spectrum allocation (FSA), and (ii)
Dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA). In FSA, each operator has its own independent
spectrum usage rights (or PCCs); therefore, no frequency overlapping occurs, nor it
generates any inter-operator interference. However, on the other hand, there exists a
common pool of spectrum (or SCCs), for which operators contend for the spectrum
usage rights based on some established policies, and is termed as DSA. As multiple
operators possess the right to access the spectrum in DSA and there is no direct
mechanism to control interference between the operators, inter-operator interference
is generated as depicted in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Operators contend for spectrum within the common spectrum pool
In the following, we denote by ri,j(ki, k−i) the rate of the j-th user of the i-th
operator. ki, k−i are the carrier allocation of operators Oi and O−i respectively,
where the O−i signal may interfere with the Oi signal. We estimate throughput
Ti (ki, k−i) for a single cell operator Oi serving Ji by the Shannon capacity as
Ti =
Ji∑
j=1
ri,j(ki, k−i),
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Ti =
Ji∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
wi,j,k(ki, k−i)log2(1 + SINRi,j,k(ki, k−i)),
where SINRi,j,k(ki, k−i) and wi,j,k are the downlink user SINR and time scheduling
weight of the k-th carrier of the j-th user in the i-th operator, respectively. The
SINRi,j,k(ki, k−i) is defined as
SINRi,j,k =
Pi (ki) Ci,j(∑I
q=1,q 6=i Pq (kq)Cq,j
)
+No
,
where Pi (ki) is the signal power of the k-th carrier, s.t., total power budget P is
uniformly distributed over Ki active component carriers out of total K carriers of the
i-th operator, accordingly, P/Ki, Ci,j is the channel gain of the j-th user within the i-
th operator, No is the power density of the background noise and
∑I
q=1,q 6=i Pq (kq)Cq,j
represents the total interference power perceived by the i-th user in the k-th carrier,
which is engendered by the other operators while sharing the same carrier frequency
in DSA. We define scheduling weight wi,j,k where the i-th user is scheduled over
the k-th component carrier for a fraction wi,j,k of time in such a manner that it
maximizes throughput Ti,
max
wi,j,k
Ti
s.t.
Ji∑
j=1
wi,j,k = 1∀k
wi,j,k ≥ 0∀{j, k}.
5.2 System Model
5.2.1 Distributed Game Model
Briefly reviewing game theory, for a finite set of I operators, a game G in strategic
form game can be described as
G = 〈Si, Ui〉 ,
with the following ingredients -
• Si represents the set of strategies (or actions) for each operator Oi, i ∈ I that
are feasible during the game G,
• Ui is the utility function (or objective function), on the basis of which game
G is played amongst the operators by applying strategies or actions si ∈ Si
independently in an effort to fetch the best utility for its own.
A key concept in noncooperative game theory is the Nash equillibrium (NE), which
provides a benchmark for investigating how purely rational decision makers would
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behave [70]. NE is a profile of strategies (Si, S−i) such that each intelligent operator
has knowledge of its environment and thereby rationally acts to maximize its own
utility function Ui, depending on not only its own actions, but also other’s actions.
Mathematically, a NE is defined as
Ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Ui(s
′
i, s−i),
where s∗i is a strict NE strategy given the NE strategy s−i if, for all s
′
i ∈ Si and
s∗i ⊂ s′i.
Fundamentally, it is assumed that the operators’ strategies are independent and
chosen at their own will intelligently. However, the game formulation extending
to our work contains contingent strategies where acceptance of a strategy requires
cooperation from the opponent operator, e.g., one may request the other to switch
off an interfering carrier, and the other accedes to the request only if it sees a utility
gain in doing it.
To play such a game G, operator Oi evaluates its carrier allocation strategy s∗i and
checks for its utility® gain, accordingly,
Ui(s
∗
i , s−i) > Ui(si, s−i), (5.1)
where si and s−i are the existing strategy profiles of operators Oi and O−i respec-
tively. While there could be many viable strategies, however, the operator likely to
adopt a strategy that fetches it a highest possible utility gain. If Eq. (5.1) is sat-
isfied, operator Oi requests operator O−i for the fulfilment of its strategy s∗i . Now,
operator O−i analyzes its utility function U−i, accordingly,
U−i(s∗i , s−i) > U−i(si, s−i). (5.2)
If the above given inequality is satisfied, the evaluated strategy s∗i is confirmed.
After mutual agreement, the new yielded outcome strategy s∗i = (si)i∈I comes into
existence, s∗i → si and eventually, the strategy profile of the operators converges
to NE. It has to be noted that the described game model is noncooperative even
though the strategies are contingent, but they never reveal any of its utility related
information to the other. Besides, the decisions are made locally, unlike in [37] where
operators compare their utility gains/losses with each other and jointly make their
decisions.
5.2.2 Utility Function
The utility function is a performance metric, whose design is considered as a bottle-
neck factor by which then, the given operator tries to optimize this function every
time whenever a strategy is played by the other, and plays its own strategy after-
wards. Normally, cell throughput or its variant, e.g., MMF, PF, mean-rate, weighted
®Here, utility is a function of cell throughput and carrier price component. Refer to Section 5.2.2
of this chapter for the detailed description.
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fair utility [29, 31] are regarded as the true measure of user satisfaction and is the
usual choice for the utility function. Operators playing noncooperative games do
not have to maintain same utility nor be aware of the utility of other operator. The
utility function is occasionally defined as
Ui = f (Ti (ki, k−i)) , (5.3)
where f represents the fairness criteria, as described in Eq. (2.2a) to (2.2c). Opera-
tors play strategies involving carrier allocation (ki, k−i) and aim to maximize their
utility function incessantly,
max
ki,k−i
Ui s.t. ki, k−i ∈ K. (5.4)
However, the operators are interested in maximizing their throughput over time
horizon T of the repeated games rather than every time instant owing to the fact
that the sacrificing operator (with a low load factor) tends to lose a small amount of
throughput in order to gain larger throughput benefits during its peak conditions,
s.t.,
max
ki(t),k−i(t)
lim
T →∞
1
T
T∫
0
Ti (ki (t) , k−i (t)) dt s.t. ki, k−i ∈ K. (5.5)
According to Eq. (5.5) operators cannot maximize their utility at all time instants
if the utility function is chosen based throughput alone or its variants (like PF,
MMF, etc. in Eq. (5.3)), which is in contradiction to what it has been stipulated
in Eq. (5.4). The reason is that, if the utility function chosen based on throughput
alone, then the operator, which is sacrificing resources, will always have immediate
lower utility. Therefore, either of the Eq. (5.1) and (5.2) will never satisfy and thus
operators will never share resources.
However, if it is desirable to have game outcomes that are closer to a social optimum,
one may change the utility by a virtual carrier price,
Ui = f(Ti)− λi, (5.6)
where λi is the virtual carrier price. There is a lot of literature available on spectrum
pricing (e.g., [49,71–73]). Here, the selection for the carrier pricing function is kept
simple and precise, instead of being modelled in terms of market based forces as
discussed in most of the literature. Therefore, we select
λi = p1
(
e
p2
∑K
k=1 ci,k
Ki − 1
)
, (5.7)
where p1 and p2 are the pricing constants, ci,k is the carrier utilization of the k-th
carrier and Ki is the sum of the active component carriers out of total K carriers in
the i-th operator. For a particular case with two operators in a given geographical
area, the carrier utilization c(k) can be set to,
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c (k) =

1,
0.5,
0,
k ∈ full carrier
k ∈ shared carrier
k ∈ unused carrier.
Virtual Carrier Price λ in utility function U penalises the operators for their carrier
usage. In the game, operators aim to maximize their utility function at every game
sequence, shown by Eq. (5.4). With increased carrier utilization, the heavily loaded
operators can have a larger throughput component in comparison to the negative
carrier pricing component in their utility function, and in succession their utility
increases. This progresses to the heavily loaded operators to afford more spectrum
resources, which is not the usual case for the sparsely loaded operators. The selection
of an exponential function for the carrier pricing component in Eq. (5.7) is due to the
fact that it penalises the operators for their increased carrier usage while ensuring the
minimal carrier utilization requirement for every operator with negligible price. The
label ‘Virtual’ signifies that the price is not measured in monetary terms, rather it is
a virtual measure or tool by which operators share the spectrum according to their
demands. In this manner, operators become able to share the spectrum resources
opportunistically and can maximize their sum-throughput noncooperatively.
5.2.3 Spectrum Usage Favors
Operators are always motivated by self-interest; therefore, they model negotiations
for carriers in terms of spectrum usage favors. The favors are referred to carrier
component utilization. It is assumed that the opponent operator cooperates pro-
vided that both operators have so far fulfilled about the same number of favors.
To do that, for instance, each operator maintains a bookkeeping system listing the
number of times each operator has been cooperative. The operators grant favors
to the opponents if they see the cooperative spirit. This kind of strategy resembles
a tit-for-tat [33, 34] strategy in a sense that it is forgiving and avoids immediate
punishment. Note that this idea can also be extended to more general cases where
operators can grant higher number of favors to the opponent provided they receive
some sort of compensation. In this study, though, we do not consider inter-operator
communication exterior to radio access and monetary transactions between the dif-
ferent entities.
Let us assume that operator Oi selects randomly a carrier and constructs the possible
favors for the different courses of strategic actions -
• Both operators utilize carrier k. Operator Oi asks operator O−i to stop using
the carrier in case if it sees the utility gain, accordingly (5.1). Operator O−i
does the favor only if its own utility gain is positive too as per Eq. (5.2).
• Operator Oi does not use carrier k, but operator O−i does. Operator Oi adopts
a strategy using carrier k. If both operators see the utility gain according to
the game (Eq. (5.1) and (5.2)), the new strategy is agreed and regarded as a
favor as it causes destructive interference to operator O−i.
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• No operator utilizes the carrier and thus, operator Oi can start using it.
• When only operator Oi utilizes the carrier, there is no interaction between the
operators.
The given below Tab. 5.1 summarises the strategic actions involving own carrier (ki)
and interfering carrier (k−i) allocations that defines a favor given to operator Oi by
operator O−i.
Table 5.1: Favors Classification
Operator Oi :
(
kti , k
t
−i
)→ (kt+1i , kt+1−i ) Favor
(on,on)→ (on,off) Yes
(off,on)→ (on,on) Yes
(off,off)→ (on,off) No
(on,off)→ (on,off) No
To mitigate the selfish behaviour of the opponents, operators limit the number of
outstanding favors. The operators incorporate a hard check stopping criterion for the
game where they model the utility function based on Eq. (5.6) and grant spectrum
usage favors to each other as long as their outstanding favors are less than surplus
limit S,
Oi :h−i − hi ≤ S,
O−i :hi − h−i ≤ S.
In contrast, say, if operator Oi has received more favors amounting S than it has
given to operator O−i, operator O−i will not review its requests further anymore un-
less operator Oi starts accepting the favors and bring down the outstanding favors
of operator O−i lower than S.
The surplus limit S controls the width of the outstanding favors window; therefore
its construction requires an appropriate care. Choosing small values can subdue the
game, whereas large values can polarize the game benefiting the particular operators.
With a selection of fitting value for the surplus limit, the operators are able to trade
resources with fairness; simultaneously keeping check on the operators’ unauthorized
requests for the unfair gains.
5.3 Proposed Algorithm I
The proposed algorithm in the form of pseudocode is summarised as below,
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Algorithm Repeated Games Model using Virtual Carrier Price for Inter-operator
Spectrum Sharing
1: Operator Oi, where i ∈ I, analyses strategy s by switching on carrier ki or
removing interfering carrier k−i. Calculates new utility Ui,s and compares it
with present utility Ui.
if Ui,s > Ui then
2: Operator O−i compares its outstanding favors with surplus S.
if h−i − hi ≤ S then
3: Operator O−i compares new utility U−i,s for strategy s with present utility
U−i.
if U−i,s > U−i then
4: Strategy s is accepted.
5: Favors are updated: h−i → h−i + 1.
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
5.4 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the algorithm mathematically, and provide theoretical
results for the optimization of pricing constants. For the analysis, we consider the
same assumptions made in Section 4.3.
5.4.1 Orthogonal Spectrum Sharing
Referring to Section 4.3.1, the PF throughput of operator Oa with orthogonal carrier
allocation, To,a is given by Eq. (4.1) and the same for operator Ob, To,b is given by
Eq. (4.2).
The sum-PF throughput of both operators, To is, To = To,a + To,b, i.e.,
To = Na log
(
K
2
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
+Nb log
(
K
2
1
Nb
log2 (1 + γb)
)
. (5.8)
5.4.2 Repeated Games based Spectrum Sharing
Let us assume, Na > Nb, and being Oa is the high load operator, so it is more
appropriate that operator Oa gets more resources in order to avoid the congestion
and blocking probability [36, 37]. Assume, ∆K amount of carriers are transferred
to high load operator Oa by low load operator Ob at the end of the sequence of a
game from the initial orthogonal allocation (where ∆K ∈ (0, K/2)). Then the new
respective PF throughputs of the operators during the game, Tg,a and Tg,b are,
Tg,a = Na log
((
K
2
+ ∆K
)
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
,
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Tg,b = Nb log
((
K
2
−∆K
)
1
Nb
log2 (1 + γb)
)
.
The sum-PF throughput of both operators, Tg is, Tg = Tg,a + Tg,b,
Tg = Na log
((
K
2
+ ∆K
)
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
+Nb log
((
K
2
−∆K
)
1
Nb
log2 (1 + γb)
)
.
The game is only beneficial if sum-throughput of game is more than the sum-
throughput in case of orthogonal sharing (Eq. (5.8)), i.e., Tg > To. Thus,
Na log
(
K
2
+ ∆K
)
+Nb log
(
K
2
−∆K
)
> Na log
(
K
2
)
+Nb log
(
K
2
)
. (5.9)
Further simplifying, (
1 + 2
∆K
K
)Na (
1− 2∆K
K
)Nb
> 1. (5.10)
Besides, as per algorithm the tranfer of ∆K spectrum resources will occur only
if the game based utilities, Ug are satisified at the operators’ end, accordingly,
Ug (k
t+1) > Ug (k
t), where kt+1 and kt are the present and past carrier allocations.
So, operator Oa checks its utility, Ug,a, accordingly, Ug,a
(
K
2
+ ∆K
)
> Ug,a
(
K
2
)
, i.e.,
Na log
((
K
2
+ ∆K
)
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
− p1
(
e
p2
(
K
2 +∆K
K
)
− 1
)
>
Na log
(
K
2
1
Na
log2 (1 + γa)
)
− p1
(
e
p2
(
K
2
K
)
− 1
)
,
Na log
(
K
2
+ ∆K
)
−Na log
(
K
2
)
> p1e
p2
(
K
2 +∆K
K
)
− p1e
p2
(
K
2
K
)
. (5.11)
Similarly, operator Ob checks its utility Ug,b, accordingly, Ug,b
(
K
2
−∆K) > Ug,b (K2 ),
i.e.,
Nb log
(
K
2
−∆K
)
−Nb log
(
K
2
)
> p1e
p2
(
K
2 −∆K
K
)
− p1e
p2
(
K
2
K
)
. (5.12)
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Optimization of Pricing Constants
With the conditions in Eq. (5.9), (5.11) and (5.12), the operators can perform opti-
mization over the spaces, p1, p2 and ∆K. However, operators strive to maximize the
cooperative gain, which can be leveraged by the maximization of the left hand side
of Eq. (5.10). Therefore, the value of ∆K such that it returns best sum-throughput
of the system is accordingly,
max
∆K
f(∆K)
s.t. f(∆K) > 0,
(5.13)
where from Eq. (5.10), f(∆K) = (1 + 2∆K/K)Na (1− 2∆K/K)Nb − 1. The solu-
tion to the given maximization probem can be achieved by df(∆K)/d(∆K) = 0,
assuming ∆K is a continous resource. Let the obtained solution be ∆Klimit.
Adding Eq. (5.11) and (5.12), we get,
Na log
(
K
2
+ ∆K
)
+Nb log
(
K
2
−∆K
)
−Na log
(
K
2
)
−Nb log
(
K
2
)
>
p1
(
e
p2
(
K
2 +∆K
K
)
+ e
p2
(
K
2 −∆K
K
)
− 2ep2 12
)
.
(5.14)
Comparing Eq. (5.9) and (5.14), it can be inferred,
p1
(
e
p2
(
K
2 +∆K
K
)
+ e
p2
(
K
2 −∆K
K
)
− 2ep2 12
)
> 0. (5.15)
From Eq. (5.11), (5.12) and (5.15), pricing constants (p1 and p2) can be obtained
accordingly,
p1e
p2
2
(
cosh
(
p2
∆K
K
)
− 1
)
> 0, (5.16a)
e
p2
2 (1+2
∆K
K ) − e p22 < log
(
1 + 2
∆K
K
)Na
p1
, (5.16b)
e
p2
2 (1−2 ∆KK ) − e p22 < log
(
1− 2∆K
K
)Nb
p1
, (5.16c)
where 0 < ∆K < K
2
and Na > Nb.
Na and Nb represent the overall load conditions in the network, and they do not
refer to instantaneous load values. Subtituting, ∆K = ∆Klimit, Na = N̂high, and
Nb = N̂low in Eq. (5.16), the optimization equations can be rewritten as
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p1 > 0, (5.17a)
p2 6= 0, (5.17b)
e
p2
2
(
1+2
∆Klimit
K
)
− e p22 < log
(
1 + 2
∆Klimit
K
) N̂high
p1
, (5.17c)
e
p2
2
(
1−2 ∆Klimit
K
)
− e p22 < log
(
1− 2∆Klimit
K
) N̂low
p1
. (5.17d)
In the analysis, ∆Klimit represents the maximum additional carriers allowed to trans-
fer by a low load operator to a high load operator from their initial equal orthogonal
carrier allocations. For N̂high = 25, N̂low = 5, we obtain ∆Klimit = 2.7 (using
Eq. (5.13)), then the optimal values of pricing constants p1 and p2 can be chosen
from the depicted region shown in Fig. 5.2e. In the simulation (Section 7.2.1) where
many of the assumptions are disregarded, we have fixed the parameters, p1 = 7 and
p2 = 0.8 in unison with the theoretical solution set (see Fig. 5.2e). We have ob-
served, out of total carriers K = 8, the maximum carrier utilization of 5.97 carriers
in the case of a high load operator (Na = 25) and the minimum carrier utilization
of 2.03 carriers in the case of a low load operator (Nb = 5) (see Fig. 7.4). It shows
that observed ∆Klimit ≈ 2¯ for the given pricing constants is in close approximation
with the theoretical results.
¯From the simulation, ∆Klimit is calculated by using initial and final carrier utilizations of
operator Oa as |8/2− 5.97|, i.e., 1.97 (or using operator Ob’s carrier utilizations, |8/2− 2.03|).
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(a) Graphical portrayal of Eq. (5.17a) (b) Graphical portrayal of Eq. (5.17b)
(c) Graphical portrayal of Eq. (5.17c) (d) Graphical portrayal of Eq. (5.17d)
(e) Intersection region of Fig. a-d
Figure 5.2: Intersection region in Fig. e delineating pricing constants p1 and p2,
obtained from Eq. (5.17) for the parameters, N̂high = 25, N̂low = 5 and ∆Klimit =
2.7.
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6 Repeated Games using Mutual History for Spec-
trum Sharing
In this chapter, we propose another coordination protocol than that discussed in
Chapter 5. In that chapter, we addressed the issue using a carrier price based util-
ity function. However, there might be a situation where operators are reluctant
to entertain the carrier pricing factor in their utility function as it penalises them
on their carrier usage. Hence, in this chapter, we address the same issue using a
throughput-based utility function and devise a new strategic mechanism for con-
tending spectrum resources amongst the operators.
We propose a noncooperative repeated games model based on mutual history of
utility gains/losses. Operators estimate their utility gains/losses and compare with
their expected gains/losses from the past games. In order to estimate gains/losses,
for instance, in downlink transmissions, the operator can ask its UEs to measure
on the carrier utilization and interference levels from the opponent BS and report
it to the serving BS, which is a simple extension of LTE handover measurements.
Assuming that operators use the same RAT, this should be possible. As a result, an
operator may select a carrier depending on (i) the carrier utilization by the operator
and the opponent, as well as (ii) the history of interactions (i.e., previous games).
An operator may ask the opponent to do a favor, e.g., to not to use a carrier. The
operators keep track of history of favors (utility gains) provided to each other, and
they use it as a check from the unfair game treatment. Finally, in Chapter 7, the
benefits of the algorithm is assessed in terms of rate distribution by comparing with
the static allocation schemes and cooperative solution.
6.1 System Description
The system description is similar to the one described in Section 5.1.
6.2 System Model
To begin with, we consider a simple scenario, where the operators have equal rights
to the shared part of the spectrum. It is in the benefit of an operator, to demand
spectrum resources when it witnesses high load in order to avoid congestion and
blocking probability. The demands of an additional spectrum resources are consid-
ered as spectrum usage favors. Favors are granted for a single time slot. Prior to
asking a favor, the operator evaluates its utility, and if the granted favor results in
a utility gain, it goes ahead with its request for that favor.
The carrier utilization between the two operators Oi and O−i has four possible
outcomes, shown in Tab. 6.1. Based on the carrier utilization, the operators are
always motivated to draw a favor in which they gain a carrier or may ask the other
to stop using it. However, the operators cannot selfishly switch on their unused
carriers, or dictate the others to switch off their interfering carriers. The operators
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Table 6.1: Carrier Utilization
Operator Oi : ki Operator O−i : k−i
1 1
0 1
0 0
1 0
follow a proper mechanism to come to a decision allow them to pry for favors based
on their relative requirements according to the game model. Unlike Chapter 5, the
following game model behaves in a very different manner as it accounts the history
of utility gains/losses for evaluation of carrier allocation strategies, as against the
game model presented in Chapter 5, where strategies depend on the present utilities
only.
6.2.1 Utility Function
The utility function has already been discussed in Section 5.2.2 and the operators
construct their utility function according to Eq. (5.3).
6.2.2 Evaluation of Strategy: Decision Making Process
Strategic Decision Making is a cognitive process, which produces a final outcome
from the selection of a course of action among several alternative scenarios. Sev-
eral factors can influence the decision making process, such as past experiences [74],
cognitive biases [75], etc. However, the fundamental idea behind the decision mak-
ing process (or selection of a strategy) is based on the players’ rational outlook,
available information and their past experiences. This theory is known as rational
expectations [76], a widely studied hypothesis in the spheres of economics. In this
algorithm, we aim to exploit the rational behaviour of the operators by devising a
strategic mechanism based on their past experiences and state-of-the-art, which is
described henceforth.
Operator Oi evaluates its new carrier allocation strategy s
∗
i and the corresponding
increase in the utility referred to as the immediate gain G, which is defined as
Gi = Ui (s
∗
i , s−i)− Ui (si, s−i) ,
where si and s−i are the existing carrier allocation strategy profiles of operators Oi
and O−i respectively. Operator Oi compares gain Gi with its expected loss L̂i over
the previous games. The expected loss is an estimation of future losses that operator
Oi will incur by sharing its spectrum resources with the other. The expected loss
is calculated by averaging the past losses it had incurred by giving favors (say, h−i
favors) to the other operator O−i during the game G,
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L̂i =
h−i∑
h=1
Li,h
h−i
,
where
∑
Li is the totality of past losses operator Oi had met at the hands of operator
O−i by giving it h−i spectrum usage favors through their mutual interactions. If
operator Oi finds its immediate gain Gi larger than its expected loss L̂i, i.e.,
Gi > L̂i,
operator Oi asks a favor from operator O−i to pursue to its new evaluated carrier
allocation strategy s∗i . Now, operator O−i estimates its new immediate loss L−i for
the asked carrier allocation strategy s∗i , which is calculated as
L−i = U−i (s∗i , s−i)− U−i (si, s−i) ,
and compares with its expected gain Ĝ−i over the previous games. The expected gain
is an estimation of future gains operator O−i will witness by getting the spectrum
usage favors from the other. The expected gain is calculated by averaging the past
gains it had collected during the game G,
Ĝ−i =
h−i∑
h=1
G−i,h
h−i
,
where
∑
G−i is the totality of past gains operator O−i had collected in h−i number
of the spectrum usage favors received from operator Oi through their mutual inter-
actions. If operator O−i finds its immediate loss L−i smaller than its expected gain
Ĝ−i, i.e.,
L−i < Ĝ−i,
operator O−i grants the favor and strategy s∗i comes into existence, demonstrating
equilibria of the appropriate type, i.e., s∗i → si. The history is updated at the both
ends enlisting their respective immediate gain/loss. The game is played in repeated
bounds, and in the next time slot, the operator(s) again try to contest for resources
randomly. In every case, a decision is conferred based on the present gain/loss and
history over the previous games. Further, the operators agree on a limit which
restraints the maximum allowable spectrum usage favors (or surplus limit S), and
helps mediating favors by normative pressure to reciprocate.
6.2.3 Constraints: Initialization and Spectrum Usage Favors
Initialization
The operation of the distributive algorithm requires an initialization. With initial-
ization, the operators at the beginning of the game contend for spectrum resources
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having a small load factor and register approximate small gains/losses δ. It is nec-
essary because herewith the operator would be more liberistic in asking favors and
in contrast equally conservative in granting them. This unfolding behavior enables
operators to respond to asymmetric load conditions. This is illustrated in the math-
ematical analysis of Section 6.4.2.
L̂i ≈ Ĝi ≈ L̂−i ≈ Ĝ−i ≈ δ at time t→ 0.
Spectrum Usage Favors
The discussion related to the spectrum usage favors and surplus limit behavior has
been posted in Section 5.2.3.
6.3 Proposed Algorithm II
The proposed algorithm in the form of pseudocode is summarised as below,
Algorithm Repeated Games Model using Mutual History for Inter-operator Spec-
trum Sharing
1: Operator Oi, where i ∈ I, analyses strategy s by switching on carrier ki or
removing interfering carrier k−i. Calculates immediate utility gain Gi,s and
compares it with expected utility loss L̂i =
h−i∑
h=1
Li,h
h−i
.
if Gi,s > L̂i then
2: Operator O−i compares its outstanding favors with surplus S.
if h−i − hi ≤ S then
3: Operator O−i compares immediate utility loss L−i,s for strategy s with ex-
pected utility gain Ĝ−i =
h−i∑
h=1
IG−i,h
h−i
.
if L−i,s < Ĝ−i then
4: Strategy s is accepted.
5: Operator Oi records Gi,s.
6: Operator O−i records L−i,s.
7: Favors are updated: h−i → h−i + 1.
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
6.4 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the algorithm mathematically, and provide the theoretical
results. For the analysis, we consider the same assumptions made in Section 4.3.
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6.4.1 Orthogonal Spectrum Sharing
Initially, the operators were sharing the spectrum in an orthogonal manner, i.e.,
each operator had allocated non-overlapping fixed number of K/2 carriers. The
orthogonal utility of operators Oa and Ob, i.e., Uo,a and Uo,b are described in Eq. (4.1)
and (4.2) respectively. The Operators play repeated games in order to improve their
current under-achieved utilities as described in the next section.
6.4.2 Repeated Games based Spectrum Sharing
We begin the analysis by defining the following symbols for i = a, b,
Gti, immediate gain of operator Oi at time slot t,
Lti, immediate loss of operator Oi at time slot t,
Ĝti, expected gain of operator Oi till time slot t,
L̂ti, immediate loss of operator Oi till time slot t.
Game Initialization
The game requires to be initialized with a small load. Assume, operators Oa and Ob
have begun with a load of one user initially. With equal loads, both operators play
the game for some time and generate approximately equal and small gains/losses.
Thus, their expected gains/losses at time slot t are assumed,
L̂ta ≈ Ĝta ≈ L̂tb ≈ Ĝtb ≈ δ. (6.1)
Game Beginning
Consider Operator Oa is experiencing a high load while operator Ob has a low load,
i.e., Na > Nb. Now, two cases arise, either high load operator Oa receives more
spectrum usage favors in the form of component carriers from low load operator Ob
or vice-versa over the next time slot t + 1. Let us calculate the probability of the
occurrence for the mentioned cases.
Case I : High load operator Oa receives more spectrum usage favor(s) from low load
operator Ob at time slot t+ 1,
Gt+1a > L̂
t
a, (6.2a)
Lt+1b < Ĝ
t
b. (6.2b)
Case II : Low load operator Ob gets more favor(s) from high load operator Oa at
time slot t+ 1,
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Gt+1b > L̂
t
b, (6.3a)
Lt+1a < Ĝ
t
a. (6.3b)
In order to know the probability of occurence for the mentioned cases, we need to
know how possibly Ga or Gb increases and La or Lb decreases in comparison to the
expected gain/loss, i.e., δ (from Eq. (6.1)). For this, let us compute the generalized
equations for both immediate gain (G) and immediate loss (L).
Let us assume, an operator gets spectrum resources from another operator°, then
the immediate gain can be calculated by subtracting the operator’s past utility from
its present utility, accordingly,
Gt+1 = N log
(
kt+1
N
log2 (1 + γ)
)
−N log
(
kt
N
log2 (1 + γ)
)
,
where kt is the past orthogonal carrier allocation, kt+1 is the present orthogonal
carrier allocation (s.t., kt+1 > kt), γ is the SNR of component carriers and N is the
load an operator. Simplifying G,
Gt+1 = N log
(
kt+1
kt
)
. (6.4)
Similarly, the immediate loss for an operator (with kt+1 < kt) can be shown as
Lt+1 = N log
(
kt
kt+1
)
. (6.5)
It is observable in Eq. (6.4) and (6.5) that both Gt+1 and Lt+1 will be larger for
high load N . With Na > Nb, using initial orthogonal utilities Uo,a and Uo,b as past
utilities, i.e, kta = k
t
b = K/2, k
t+1
a = (K/2) + x and k
t+1
b = (K/2) − x, where
0 < x < K/2, it can be implied that,
Gt+1a > L
t+1
b . (6.6)
Even though ktb/k
t+1
b is slightly superior than k
t+1
a /k
t
a, but the load’s influence is
far more pronounced, i.e., due to larger Na in comparison to Nb, Ga gets better. A
numerical example may clarify the mechanics of the presented analysis. Using sim-
ulation input parameters, K = 8, Na = 25 and Nb = 5, the transference of 1 carrier
(x = 1) from low load operator Ob to high load operator Oa from an initial equal
orthogonal carrier allocation fetches values where log10(k
t+1
a /k
t
a) = 0.097 is lower
than log10(k
t
b/k
t+1
b ) = 0.125; on the opposite, G
t+1
a = 2.423 exceeds L
t+1
b = 0.624.
From Eq. (6.1), (6.2) and (6.6), we get,
Gt+1a > δ > L
t+1
b ,
°We assume complete carrier transference is equivalent to even number of favors.
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and it demonstrates that Case I is more likely to prevail over Case II. Therefore,
at the beginning of the game, the high load operator is preferred over the low load
operator for spectrum usage favors, i.e., operator Oa starts gaining carriers.
Game Progression
If, for the time, the state of load conditions remains same, i.e., operator Oa con-
tinues to bear a high load while operator Ob has a low load, in due course, the
tendency of low load operator Ob to rent out more and more carriers turns highly
unlikely. This is due to the fact that it increases its immediate loss Lt+1 very much
against expected gain Ĝt (see Eq. (6.5), limkt+1→0Lt+1 =∞). As a result, the carrier
transfer ceases at some point where it cannot satisfy Lt+1 < Ĝt further anymore.
However, the amount of carriers transferred to the high load operator by the low
load operator does not guarantee of an optimal carrier allocation. Therefore, we
require a constraint in the form of a surplus which limits the carrier transference
resulting in an approximate optimal carrier allocation.
Game: Role of Surplus
Let us assume, at the end of the game, operator Oa has collected ∆K additional
carriers from operator Ob from its initial orthogonal carrier allocation. The value of
∆K, for which the game fetches the approximate best sum-utility for the operators
is given by the Eq. (5.13) and its solution is exactly the same described by ∆Klimit
for the same equation. By appropriately selecting surplus limit S±, we can cap the
carrier transference limit to ∆Klimit. However, ∆Klimit changes with temporal load
variations because operators’ loads Na and Nb are not fixed. Besides, the game
is noncooperative, and the operators are not allowed to convey their load related
information to each other. Therefore, the operators at the beginning can optimize
∆Klimit based on load estimations (commonly observed average load, maximum
load, minimum load, etc.) and decide the surplus limit parameter.
In the simulation, we have used K = 8 (PCCs = 2, SCCs = 6), Na = 25, Nb = 5
and the users are uniformly distributed in the operator’s access area. We observed,
∆Klimit = 2
² (for surplus limit S=4) in a closer bound to the cooperative solution.
For the same inputs, theoretically where many assumptions are regarded, we obtain
∆Klimit = 2.7 and lies close to the simulated result.
Game Reversal
In this section, we would like to show that with a change in relative load status,
±According to the definition, surplus limit is defined in terms of favors (see Section 6.2.3).
However, it is possible to translate the surplus limit definition in terms of carriers limit, because
Scarriers = 2Sfavors.
²See Section 7.2.2, for S = 4, Oa’s SCCs = 5, Ob’s SCC = 1 and both have a single PCC;
therefore, ∆Klimit = |8/2− (5 + 1)| or |8/2− (1 + 1)|.
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the game behaviour also changes, i.e., the new high load operator starts collecting
spectrum usage favors from the low load operator. Here, we discuss two cases, the
one in which the new low load (previously high load) operator gets more favor(s)
from the other or vice versa. We will provide suggestive evidence that the opera-
tion of the first case becomes predominantly impossible, whereas the second case is
plausible with a dependency on input specifications.
Proceeding with the analysis, we would like to measure first the expected gain/loss
for operators Oa and Ob till time slot t+ 1. Representing operators’ previously load
status as N−a and N
−
b , s.t., N
−
a > N
−
b
³, and assuming x component carriers had
transferred to operator Oa by operator Ob during time slot t+ 1, s.t., x ≤ ∆Klimit,
we calculate,
L̂t+1a ≈ Ĝt+1b ≈ δ, (6.7)
Ĝt+1a =
haδ +G
t+1
a
ha + 1
,
L̂t+1b =
haδ + L
t+1
b
ha + 1
,
where ha is the number of times operator Oa had received favors from the other
during the game initialization. Gt+1a and L
t+1
b can be calculated using Eq. (6.4)
and (6.5) with carrier allocation status kt+1a = K/2 + x and k
t+1
b = K/2− x at time
slot t+ 1. Therefore, Ĝt+1a and L̂
t+1
b can be rewritten as
Ĝt+1a =
haδ +N
−
a log
(
K
2
+x
K
2
)
ha + 1
, (6.8)
L̂t+1b =
haδ +N
−
b log
(
K
2
K
2
−x
)
ha + 1
. (6.9)
Let us assume at time slot t + 2, operator Ob is experiencing relatively high load
conditions than operator Oa, i.e., Na < Nb. The operators play the game and ask
each other for y additional carriers. Again two cases arises, either low load operator
Oa gets resources or high load operator Ob.
Case I : Low load operator Oa receives more favor(s) from high load operator Ob at
time slot t+ 2,
Gt+2a > L̂
t+1
a , (6.10a)
Lt+2b < Ĝ
t+1
b . (6.10b)
³‘-’ denotes the past load status.
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Calculating Gt+2a and L
t+2
b using Eq. (6.4) and (6.5), we get,
Gt+2a = Na log
(
K
2
+ x+ y
K
2
+ x
)
, (6.11)
Lt+2b = Nb log
(
K
2
− x
K
2
− x− y
)
. (6.12)
Let us evalute Case I feasibility. Using Eq. (6.7), we rewrite Eq. (6.10) as
Gt+2a > δ > L
t+2
b . (6.13)
Using the results of Eq. (6.11) and (6.12) in Eq. (6.13), we get,(
K
2
+ x+ y
K
2
+ x
)Na
>
(
K
2
− x
K
2
− x− y
)Nb
. (6.14)
With x > 0, y > 0, x + y < K
2
, and Na < Nb; Eq. (6.14) is not satisfied and the
prevalence of Case I almost becomes impossible.
Case II : High load operator Ob receives more favor(s) from low load operator Oa at
time slot t+ 2,
Gt+2b > L̂
t+1
b ,
Lt+2a < Ĝ
t+1
a .
Calculating Gt+2b and L
t+2
a using Eq. (6.4) and (6.5), we get,
Gt+2b = Nb log
(
K
2
− x+ y
K
2
− x
)
, (6.15)
Lt+2a = Na log
(
K
2
+ x
K
2
+ x− y
)
. (6.16)
Comparing Gt+2b with L̂
t+2
b (See Eq. (6.15) and (6.9)); there is a good amount of
probability that Gt+2b can exceed L̂
t+2
b because for some values of Nb and y, it is
possible to have,
Nb log
(
K
2
− x+ y
K
2
− x
)
> δ +
N−b
ha + 1
log
(
K
2
K
2
− x
)
,
where Nb > Na, N
−
b < N
−
a , 0 < x < K/2, 0 < y < (K/2) + x and ha > 0.
Similarly, there is a room of possibility that Ĝt+2a can exceed L
t+2
a , i.e.,
δ +
N−a
ha + 1
log
(
K
2
+ x
K
2
)
> Na log
(
K
2
+ x
K
2
+ x− y
)
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for the same inputs.
Observing the analysis, it can be inferred that the noncooperative spectrum sharing
games between the competitive operators benefit the heavily loaded operator for
spectrum usage favors and improve spectrum efficiency of the network operators.
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7 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this chapter, several system level simulation results of the proposed schemes in
Chapters 5 and 6 are presented. The DSA techniques for inter-operator spectrum
sharing are analyzed and investigated against the static allocation schemes - or-
thogonal and full spread spectrum sharing with varying interference conditions. In
addition, as a baseline for comparison, the simulation results are also compared with
the Pareto optimal cooperative schemes. We have used Monte Carlo methods for
the simulations.
7.1 Simulation Scenario
We consider a small cell LTE based network comprising of 2 operators each have 2
BSs and a Poisson distributed mean load of 25 and 5 users in their given access area.
The BSs are deployed in a single storey building separated by walls and the users
are uniformly distributed within the operator’s access area. The BSs’ locations and
coverage areas are illustrated in Fig. 7.1 and Tab. 7.1.
The total bandwidth of the system comprising operators Oa and Ob is equally di-
vided into 8 component carriers. The centre of frequencies of the operators needs
not to be adjacent. For example, if we assume that the UEs are LTE Release-10
UEs, and then carrier aggregation can be applied to serve the UEs in the sub-band
of shared frequency if the bandwidth of the operators is not contiguous. The ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) for each component carrier is kept constant,
No. Downlink power control is not exercised. The available power budget is divided
equally among the used carriers for downlink transmissions. The transmitting BSs
are full buffer in that they always have data to send.
Regarding the channel modelling, the signal power attenuates according to a power
law model for distance-based path loss, i.e., Cd−A with path loss exponent A = 3.6,
attenuation constant C = 1e-4 and distance d between the BS and the UE. For the
sake of simplicity, we do not consider shadow fading, or frequency selective fading,
or other indoor channel models, e.g., WINNER II because the protocol’s behaviour
is independent of fading or attenuation characterizations. The degree of spectrum
sharing depends on the inter-operator interference. Therefore, to model different
interference environments, the wall attenuation between the neighbouring BSs is
allowed to change. Details of the system parameters are given in Tab. 7.1.
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(a) Multi-operator scenario in an office building
(b) Single floor layout of an office building
Figure 7.1: Indoor inter-operator deployment scenario
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Table 7.1: Simulation Parameters
Systeml Model
Carrier frequency 2.6 [GHz]
Carrier bandwidth 12.5 [MHz]
Total component carriers 8
Primary component carriers (PCCs) 2
Secondary component carriers (SCCs) 6
BS transmit power 30 [dBm]
Antenna patterns Omni directional
Noise figure 15 [dB]
Noise thermal power -174 [dBm/Hz]
Path Loss Model
Power law path loss model PL [dB] = A ∗ 10log10 (d[m]) +
10log10
(
1
C
)
+W
Path loss coefficients A = 3.6
C = 1e-4
Wall attenuation (W ) 0 [dB] (High interference scenario)
10 [dB] (Low interference scenario)
Scenario Model
Number of operators 2
Number of BSs/operator 2
Number of buildings 1
Number of floors/building 1
Number of rooms/floor 4
Number of BSs/room 1
Traffic Model
Number of UEs/operator Poisson distributed load with mean 25
or 5
UEs distribution Uniformly distributed
Link Level Model
Spectral efficiency r = BWeff ∗ BW ∗ log2 (1 + SINR)
Bandwidth efficiency BWeff = .56
Algorithm Parameters
Maximum outstanding favors or sur-
plus (S)
2, 4
7.2 Performance Evaluation
The results are presented for 1000 random network instantiations, generated accord-
ing to the aforementioned parameters. Scheduling weight per carrier wi,j,k (Eq. (5.1))
is fixed and inversely proportional to their BS’s load. The BSs within an operator
use the same component carriers, however the BSs of different operators can have
different carrier allocations. For each deployment, the repeated games are allowed to
run for 30 counters. The operators’ favors (refer Section 5.2.3, 6.2.3) and gains/losses
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(only in the case of Algorithm II, refer Section 6.2.2) are recorded at the end of the
game sequences and fed to the next deployment.
The data rates are experienced by the individual users tracked after each deployment
and collected over 1000 deployments. The histogram is used to generate the user
rate probability distribution over all realizations, which then used to plot the user
rate cumulative distributive functions (CDFs). The user rate CDFs are plotted for
operators Oa and Ob with respective Poisson distributed mean load of 25 and 5 users.
Load reversal cases also been considered to assess the performance with varying load
conditions. The user rate CDFs are plotted for 2000 instantiations, where in the
halfway of the simulation, the loads are reversed with same Poisson distributed mean
load, i.e., for the first 1000 deployments, the loads of operators Oa and Ob are 25
and 5 users respectively, and during the latter half, the respective loads are 5 and
25 users. The effect of temporal load variations depicted in the simulations defines
the practicability of the scenarios. Besides, the effect of surplus S has also been
analyzed for the mentioned plots. Two cases with different interference conditions
are taken into consideration -
1. High interference scenario (with wall loss of 0 dB),
2. Low interference scenario (with wall loss of 10 dB).
Henceforth, we present the analysis of both algorithms achieving about the same
outcomes.
7.2.1 Algorithm I Analysis
The Algorithm I considers a carrier pricing based utility function for the repeated
games framework. The operators pay the penalty on their carriers usage which
forces them to share the bandwidth resources according to their relative needs. In
the simulation, the pricing constants p1 and p2 are set as 7 and 0.8 respectively
according to the optimization criteria discussed in Section 5.4.2. Fig. 7.2 shows the
user rate CDFs for two operators Oa and Ob in a high interference scenario (wall
loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors is set equal to, S = 2. It
can be seen, with dynamic spectrum sharing, high load operator Oa becomes able to
improve its delivered throughput in comparison with the orthogonal static allocation.
On the other hand, low load operator Ob’s throughput falls, but operators do not
mind sacrificing their resources during low load conditions if they are anticipating
benefits in the demanding circumstances. This behaviour is captured in Fig. 7.3
when the load gets reversed. The figure shows the user rate distribution for operator
Oa spanning over the temporal load variations be fitted with its initial high load (of
25 users), and latter low load (of 5 users) instances. In the figure, it is observable
that operator Oa’s delivered throughput has improved over time in comparison to
the orthogonal sharing even though it has sacrificed the spectrum resources latter
when the load was sparse. The similar behaviour has been noticed for operator Ob
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during the simulation because, on an average, the loads are same over time for the
both operators in the load reversal scenario.
Figure 7.2: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users and operator Ob,
Nb = 5 users using the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing,
cooperative algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a high inter-
ference environment (wall loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors,
S = 2.
Figure 7.3: Rate distribution for operator Oa with temporal load variations using
the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing, cooperative algorithm
and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a high interference environment (wall
loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors, S = 2.
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In the game, surplus parameter plays a crucial role in controlling the trading of
spectrum resources. It puts a limit on the number of spectrum usage favors given
by the operators to each other as it ensures that the sacrificing operator retains an
adequate amount of spectrum for its smoother operation while dynamically sharing
the spectrum. In Fig. 7.4, the effect of surplus is analyzed on the user rate distribu-
tions for high load operator Oa. In the simulation, the average carrier utilizations
in SCCs (6 carriers) using a surplus limit of 2 are observed as 4.02 for high load
operator Oa and 1.99 for low load operator Ob, whereas with surplus limit 4, the
average carrier utilizations are 4.97 and 1.03 respectively. It indicates that with
easing off in surplus limit value, the operators’ exploitation of the degree of freedom
in frequency domain increases and the throughput gain approaches the efficient co-
operative solution. Though, operators have SCCs of 6 carriers, which means, the
maximal surplus limit can be fixed at 6. Nevertheless, it has been observed that
the large surplus limit value becomes redundant once it reaches the approximate
cooperative solution, i.e., surplus 4 to 6 almost give the same performance. The
reason is that the carrier pricing component in the utility function keeps the carrier
allocations (of both operators) optimal if the surplus limit is larger than the optimal
carrier allocation (cooperative carrier allocation) of the high load operator. How-
ever, in the case of high load operator, its carrier allocation reduces to the surplus
limit if the surplus limit is lower than its optimal carrier allocation.
Figure 7.4: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users using the cooperative
algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a high interference envi-
ronment (wall loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors is varied
and rate curves are analysed for, S = 2 and 4.
The algorithm’s efficiency is also tested in a low interference environment, where
interference is suppressed by increasing the wall attenuation to 10 dB between the
BSs. The analysis is quite much same as it is discussed for the above case of high
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interference scenario. The only difference lies here is that now operators have more
degree of overlapped carriers. Describing briefly, Fig. 7.5 shows the user rate distri-
butions for operators Oa and Ob. In the figure, high load operator Oa gathers more
spectrum resources than low load operator Ob according to their load conditions.
Similarly, Fig. 7.6 shows the user rate distribution for operator Oa over time when
it had a high load initially and later a low load. The figure shows that the oper-
ators are able to improve their throughput over time through dynamically sharing
the spectrum in comparison to the static allocations. The behaviour of surplus is
captured in Fig. 7.7. In the simulation, the average carrier utilizations in SCCs with
surplus limit 2 are observed as 6.0 for high load operator Oa and 3.99 for low load
operator Ob, and with surplus limit 4, the average carrier utilizations are 6.0 and
2.14 respectively.
Figure 7.5: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users and operator Ob,
Nb = 5 users using the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing,
cooperative algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a low interfer-
ence environment (wall loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors,
S = 2.
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Figure 7.6: Rate distribution for operator Oa with temporal load variations using
the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing, cooperative algorithm
and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a low interference environment (wall
loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors, S = 2.
Figure 7.7: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users using the cooperative
algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm I, in a low interference environ-
ment (wall loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors is varied and
rate curves are analysed for, S = 2 and 4.
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7.2.2 Algorithm II Analysis
Algorithm II tries to attain the same objective what Algorithm I does. The Algo-
rithm II considers mutual gain/loss history by which the operators play repeated
games to share the spectrum dynamically. The working of the algorithm requires an
initialization, and for this we have initialized both operators with a load of a single
user in the simulation, and let it run for around 100 instants. In the performance
curves, we have considered PF based user rates. The analysis of results is similar to
what we have presented for Algorithm I in Section 7.2.1.
Simulation result in Fig. 7.8 shows the user rate CDFs of operators Oa and Ob with
respective mean load of 25 and 5 users. It is quite visible from the figure, that
high load operator Oa has become able to improve its delivered throughput at the
expense of low load operator Ob. Though, operator Ob suffers at the moment, but
when its load gets high in the near future, it will be getting its rightful share of the
spectrum resources. This behaviour is captured in Fig. 7.9, where loads get reversed
after some time, i.e., now operator Oa has a mean load of 5 users while operator
Ob has a mean load of 25 users. The user rate curves are plotted for operator Oa
over the time span when it had a mean load of 25 and latter of 5 users. The game
is modelled in a high interference scenario (wall loss, 0 dB), and the plotted rate
curves affirm that the game based DSA scheme provides a clear benefit over the
orthogonal sharing with asymmetric loading and improves throughput with time.
Figure 7.8: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users and operator Ob,
Nb = 5 users using the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing,
cooperative algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a high inter-
ference environment (wall loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors
S = 2.
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Figure 7.9: Rate distribution for operator Oa with temporal load variations using
the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing, cooperative algorithm
and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a high interference environment
(wall loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors S = 2.
Apart from that, in the game, the maximum limit for outstanding favors (surplus
limit S) is kept at 2, which means neither of the operators can trade spectrum re-
sources more than the limit while dynamically sharing the spectrum. In Fig. 7.10,
the surplus limit behaviour on the game is captured. It can be seen that with
an increase in the surplus limit, the high load operator’s throughput improvement
steadily approaches the cooperative solution. In the simulation, the average car-
rier utilizations in SCCs (6 carriers) using a surplus limit of 2 are observed as 4.09
for high load operator Oa and 2.0 for low load operator Ob, whereas with surplus
limit 4, the average carrier utilizations are 5.0 and 1.0 respectively. It indicates that
with easing off in the surplus limit value, the operators’ tendency for sharing the
spectrum increases and become more pronounced. Though, the operators have SCC
of 6 carriers, which means, the maximal surplus limit can be fixed at 6. However,
with a larger surplus limit (e.g., here, if more than 4), high load operator Oa’s gain
surpasses the cooperative solution. It indicates that the loss of low load operator
Ob will be more than the gain of high load operator Oa, and the sum-throughput of
operators will diminish. Therefore, it is essential to optimize the surplus limit pa-
rameter to have a maximal benefit, which has been discussed in detail, in Section 6.4.
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Figure 7.10: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users using the cooperative
algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a high interference envi-
ronment (wall loss, 0 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors S is varied
and rate curves are analysed for, S = 2 and 4.
Similarly, the rate curves have also been plotted for a low interference environment
(with wall loss of 10 dB). In this, the full spread is the dominant static allocation.
According to Fig. 7.11 and 7.12, it is observable that, with the game based spectrum
sharing, the operators’ spectrum allocation are now more closely aligned to the full
spread rather than the orthogonal. Besides, the rate curves are observed better than
the full spread. The reason is that the interference in this scenario is suppressed,
but not completely eliminated. However, it has been observed that with a wall
loss of over 20 dB, both full spread and game curves converge, and the operators
utilize the full spectrum with negligible interference. The surplus behaviour also
been captured in Fig. 7.13, which shows that, with an increase in the surplus limit,
the spectrum sharing improves and reaches the cooperative solution for some limit
(of 4, as observed in the figure). In the simulation, the average carrier utilizations
in SCCs with surplus limit 2 are observed as 5.9 for high load operator Oa and 4.3
for low load operator Ob, and with surplus limit 4, the average carrier utilizations
are 5.9 and 2.3 respectively. With a further increase in the surplus limit parameter,
the overall sum-through starts declining and deviating from the optimal gain, same
as it is discussed for the high interference scenario.
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Figure 7.11: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users and operator Ob,
Nb = 5 users using the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing,
cooperative algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a low inter-
ference environment (wall loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors
S = 2.
Figure 7.12: Rate distribution for operator Oa with temporal load variations using
the traditional orthogonal and full spread spectrum sharing, cooperative algorithm
and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a low interference environment (wall
loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors S = 2.
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Figure 7.13: Rate distribution for operator Oa, Na = 25 users using the cooperative
algorithm and proposed scheme based on Algorithm II, in a low interference envi-
ronment (wall loss, 10 dB). The maximum number of outstanding favors S is varied
and rate curves are analysed for, S = 2 and 4.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis reports the findings, whose main objective is to demonstrate how sharing
paradigms in wireless networks, in particular spectrum sharing improves the spec-
tral efficiency. We describe and evaluate different scenarios where spectrum sharing
is considered in the context of multi-operator cooperation, namely full spread or
orthogonal sharing. More specifically, we investigate the impact of noncooperative
games between the operators on spectrum sharing. Our numerical results show that
properly modelled games may provide a gain in terms of system-level throughput,
with respect to full spread and orthogonal spectrum sharing scenarios over the time.
The performance of the specific techniques is strongly dependent on several system
parameters, such as the number of users, QoS and the rational outlook of the oper-
ators. More importantly, the gains are significant when the number of serving users
by an operator is relatively large, and the BSs have enough degrees of freedom to
efficiently schedule the users.
8.1 Summary
In this thesis, we have investigated the inter-operator spectrum sharing problem be-
tween the self-interested operators. Operators exist in nearby geographical area with
neighbouring RANs. The problem is modelled via game theoretic approach for an
efficient DSA. The spectrum resources amongst the operators divided into, (i) FSA
and (ii) DSA. In FSA, privately owned orthogonal frequency bands are allocated
to the operators where no inter-operator interference exists. Whereas in DSA, the
operators contend for resources from a common spectrum pool. The operators fol-
low the repeated games framework and devise strategies to fetch spectrum resources
based on their requirements (e.g., load congestion, QoS, etc.). The games are played
entirely on a noncooperative basis as no operational information is revealed to the
other. Leveraging this analysis, two different taxonomies of the noncooperative DSA
algorithm have been proposed.
Chapter 5 discusses the first algorithm, where a carrier pricing based utility function
has been considered for the repeated games framework. The utility design penalizes
the operators when it comes to their spectrum usage. In the games, the opera-
tors aim to maximize their utility at every game sequence. This leads to sharing
of spectrum resources between the operators based on their spectrum affordability,
eventually favoring the congested operators.
In Chapter 6, another coordination algorithm is introduced, where mutual inter-
actions between the operators is recognized as the basis for resource sharing. In
this, the operators translate their past gains/losses due to spectrum sharing over
the previous games into their future benefits. The operators play noncooperative
repeated games, and if they expect promising future gains, they readily sacrifice
their resources upon requests and accordingly trade resources.
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To curb the favoritism towards operators(s) in collecting spectrum usage favors in
the algorithms, a limit has been imposed in the form of surplus. Surplus establishes
a trust mechanism and ensures that the operators sacrifice resources for each other
as long as the other was helpful in the past. Setting up this parameter requires an
appropriate measure, as too small value does not let the game run effectively or too
much of a relaxation in the value might distinctly favor the operators.
For the purpose of performance analysis, a scenario has been considered, comprising
of two operators with their neighboring RANs in a single storey building. Each
operator has two BSs, and all the BSs are geographically separated by the walls.
The operator’s loads are Poisson distributed, but their locations are uniformly dis-
tributed within the operator’s access area. A spectrum band of 8 carriers is available
to the operators, which is partitioned exclusively into two allocations - FSA, and
DSA. In FSA, both operators are allocated a single orthogonal carrier whereas
in DSA, a spectrum pool of 6 carriers is shared. As a baseline for comparison,
the benefits of the algorithms are assessed against the static allocations - orthogo-
nal and full spread, and Pareto efficient cooperative algorithm (reference Chapter 4).
In the simulation results, the performance of algorithms achieving dynamic spec-
trum sharing outperforms the typical static allocation schemes (orthogonal or full
spread) under varying interference conditions or load factors. The cooperative al-
gorithm serves best in the scenario. However, such choice is disregarded by the
self-interested operators because of the trust issues and significant overhead con-
straints. Though, it categorically provides an optimal benchmark solution for the
study of game algorithms. The operators opportunistically share resources and max-
imize their sum-throughput noncooperatively with an effort to converge to the ideal
cooperative solutions.
8.2 Future Work
We do not expect this work to be complete and there are several areas where the
research done in this thesis could be expanded.
1. In the simulations, only two operators each have two BSs, have been consid-
ered. Extending this work many BSs could lead to interesting findings in terms
of interference management. One also can implement the cooperative schemes
for intra-operator radio resource management. However, this makes the prob-
lem of scheduling extremely complicated and requires some implementation to
speed up the scheduling of users in the network.
2. The proposed Algorithm II, based on mutual history of gains/losses, could
add many facets to its decision making mechanism. For instance, the op-
erators could incorporate outstanding favors in the decision making process
rather than using it alone for a hard check. Also, the operators can categorize
favors into big and small favors, and formulate policies in granting them, e.g.,
resorting to leniency in granting small favors.
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3. The operators consider the current traffic load only without anticipating the
future. The algorithm has a room to be equipped with accurate load modelling.
This could save the operators from unnecessary processing time and energy
consumption in forwarding the requests and subsequent decision making. With
accurate load modelling, the operators convey requests when it is right to do
and thus, can make accurate reservations of spectrum resources proactively.
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